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Abstract 
I explore the conditions under which mergers of two poorly performing firms can 
create value and how such conditions behave differently in mergers including at least one 
well-performing firm. I argue that in mergers of poor performers, the greater the 
disruption of routines induced by the merger, the higher the post-merger performance. In 
this study, I conceptualize a merger as the combination of two firms‘ existing routines 
and propose that such a combination can provide the impetus necessary to break from the 
past by creating a new set of routines. When two weak firms merge, such a break from 
the past becomes desirable because the existing value creation system does not work 
properly and routine disruption becomes a necessary condition for deriving good post-
merger performance. I test these ideas on a sample of M&As from multiple industries in 
the U.S. between 1994 and 2006. Using an industry-adjusted Tobin‘s q based on the 
―Chop-shop‖ approach as a criterion to classify firms into weak and strong categories, I 
find that disruption of routines is indeed desirable in mergers of poor performers while it 
should be minimized in mergers including a well-performing firm. This dissertation 
makes theoretical contributions by highlighting the role of a M&A in a firm‘s 
evolutionary process. It also has practical implications for managers and policymakers. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When General Motors and Chrysler announced their plans to merge in October 
2008, analysts scoffed at the news. One commentator remarked, ―You‟ve got to be 
kidding me. General Motors and Chrysler merge? If ever there was an example of the old 
saw, „Two wrongs don‟t make a right,‟ this, surely, is it‖ (Newsweek, 2008). Similarly, 
when two troubled airlines, Delta and Northwest, announced their merger in April 2008, 
investors were unimpressed with the idea. As one analyst puts it, "The bottom line is we 
have two big airlines that are struggling to make money and we're going to end up with 
one really big airline that's struggling to make money" (Haugen, 2008).  
General Motors explained its motivation for a merger as large-scale cost savings 
by getting rid of massive overhead. The two airlines also tried to justify their deal with 
the motives of market power and cost reduction (e.g., removing some of their fleets and 
laying off workers). However, industry observers seem to be suspicious of the idea of 
merging two weak firms, based on the conventional wisdom that no strength can come 
out of weakness. The following quote regarding a merger of Kmart and Sears well shows 
how these deals are perceived by the market: 
“The question is: can two weak retailers become one strong retailer?  The 
combination of the two gives them greater buying power to compete with Wal-Mart and 
more importantly, fills in gaps in each store‟s merchandise line. It‟s an opportunity to 
transform two companies that once were great because each firm has struggled on its 
own; it remains to be seen whether the combined company can manage to keep up with 
thriving competitors. In any case, the merged company still faces an uphill battle against 
years of consumer perception that will have to be changed. Addressing and changing 
those perceptions will cost a lot of advertising dollars. Time will tell if the combined 
companies can pull it off.” – The New York Times, 2004 
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Surprisingly, however, many mergers of poor performers do occur.
1
 Even more 
surprising is the fact that almost half of these mergers perform well, as indicated by 
positive movement in their performance, compared to the pre-merger performance of 
merging firms. Understanding the circumstances under which combinations of weak 
firms create value can help us explain why such poor performers attempt to join forces, in 
spite of external cynicism regarding such mergers. Thus, I attempt to explain under what 
conditions weak performers are better off together than separate.  
The assumption underlying the conventional cynicism regarding the merger of 
two weak firms is that the sources of poor performance will remain intact after the 
merger, and that firms will generally continue doing what they have been doing 
previously. We can find this assumption in many of the prior explanations of what drives 
M&A performance. The frequently cited sources of synergy in mergers fall under three 
categories. First, firms may spread fixed costs (e.g., factory) over multiple product lines 
by eliminating redundant operations (economies of scale). Second, firms may share 
resources, such as brand names or technology (economies of scope). Third, the acquirer 
may replace the target‘s incompetent management with its own superior management 
(market for corporate control). All of these explanations assume that at least one party 
brings distinctive strengths that are retained and exploited after the merger. Thus, existing 
                                                 
1
 From an analysis of M&A agreements announced between 1994 and 2006 (source: SDC 
Platinum database), I found that approximately 31.8% of deals in the sample could be classified 
as mergers of two poorly performing firms. To determine if the combining firms were poor 
performers, I employed Tobin‘s q as a performance criterion and defined poor performers as 
those with profitability below a common benchmark. A similar criterion based on Tobin‘s q was 
used in other studies to classify firms into out- and underperformers (e.g., Lang, Stulz, & 
Walking, 1989; Servaes, 1991). A more detailed explanation of this can be found in Section 4.2 
of this paper. 
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theories of M&A performance cannot explain how two weak performers can generate any 
synergy, since they both come into the merger from a position of weakness. 
In this study, I propose to look at the unexplored aspect of mergers and solve the 
puzzle illustrated above. I conceptualize a merger as the combination of two firms‘ 
existing routines and propose that such a combination can provide the impetus necessary 
to break from the past by creating a new set of routines. By disrupting existing routines, a 
merger affects a firm‘s evolutionary process. Mergers, by nature, disturb the existing 
systems of the parties involved. For firms that have been performing satisfactorily, the 
disruption may be an undesired consequence of a merger, since it can hurt current 
existing routines. Therefore, strong firms may try to minimize the disruption by mergers 
and build upon their existing strengths. In contrast, poorly performing firms have 
relatively less to lose from disruptions, since their current value-generation mechanisms 
do not function properly. In fact, the disruption can ―shake‖ the two weak firms out of 
what they have been doing and may provide an impetus for change, which is usually 
beneficial, but hard to implement, due to organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984). Based on this logic, I propose that weak firms can perform well if they use 
merger-induced disruption as a turning point to overcome their inertia and enact change.  
To expand these ideas, I present three factors as indicators of routine disruption 
that influence the performance of a merged firm: the influx of outsiders, power balance 
and resource unrelatedness. The first and second effects suggest that the composition of a 
top management team (TMT) and a board of directors (BOD) affect the performance 
  4 
improvement of a merged company. The third effect suggests that a merger‘s success is 
influenced by the relatedness of the resources combined.  
The necessity of routine disruption for performance improvement in a group of 
mergers between poor performers leads to seven hypothesized observations. First, a 
positive relationship between the influx of outsiders (executives who are from outside the 
merging firms) in a TMT and the performance of a merged firm will exist for a group of 
mergers between poorly performing firms. Second, a positive relationship between the 
influx of outsiders (directors who are from outside the merging firms) in a BOD and the 
performance of a merged firm will exist for a group of mergers between poorly 
performing firms.  
Third, a positive relationship between the power balance in a TMT between 
merging firms and the performance of a merged firm will exist for a group of mergers 
between poor performers. Fourth, a positive relationship between the power balance in a 
BOD between merging firms and the performance of a merged firm will exist for a group 
of mergers between poor performers. Fifth, a positive relationship between the size 
equality of merging firms and the performance of a merged firm will exist for a group of 
mergers between poor performers.  
Sixth, a negative relationship between primary industry overlap between merging 
firms and the performance of a merged firm will exist for a group of mergers between 
poor performers. Seventh, a negative relationship between geography overlap (measured 
as the overlap of a headquarters‘ locations at the city level) between merging firms and 
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the performance of a merged firm will exist for a group of mergers between poor 
performers. 
I also expect the relationships described above not to hold or show an opposite 
direction in a group of mergers, including at least one well-performing firm. It is not a 
necessary condition for performance improvement if the mergers include at least one 
strong firm, although routine disruption would not necessarily hurt such combinations. 
Therefore, no formal prediction for such cases is made. 
The empirical analysis is based on 298 M&A deals between US firms announced 
between 1/1/1994 and 12/31/2006. The data are collected from various sources that 
include the Thompson Securities Data Corporation Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions 
database, SEC filings, Standard and Poor‘s Compustat Annual Industry Files, 
Compustat/CRSP Merged, Compustat Segment Files, and Eventus. M&A performance is 
measured by the difference between pre-merger and post-merger performance. Because 
the performance measure is a continuous variable, the statistical technique employed in 
this analysis is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
By highlighting that mergers can function as an impetus for change, this study 
intends to develop a framework complementary to the extant M&A theories, which is 
necessary for thoroughly understanding the phenomenon of mergers. Although mergers 
between poor performers occur prevalently, no systematic empirical evidence exists on 
whether and when such mergers are successful. This study intends to eliminate that gap. 
In addition, by conceptualizing a merger as the combination of two firms‘ existing 
routines, and by suggesting that a merger can change firms‘ internal routines by affecting 
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the variation and selection processes of such routines, the theory I develop in this study 
highlights the role of an M&A in a firm‘s evolutionary process. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
M&A performance and evolutionary theory. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical arguments 
of the dissertation and derives the hypotheses. Chapter 4 includes the data description and 
variable definitions for the empirical analyses. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results 
and also the results of the sensitivity analyses. Chapter 6 discusses the empirical results 
and concludes with a discussion of the contributions, limitations, and future directions of 
this research. 
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Chapter 2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
 
My dissertation explores how firms can disrupt their routines through M&As, and 
how such routine disruption affects their performance. In this review of the literature 
relevant to my dissertation, I summarize the key concepts and findings from two bodies 
of work: M&A and evolutionary theory. In each category, I first present a summary of 
the primary theories and the related empirical findings, and then highlight how my 
dissertation addresses the limitations of the prior research.   
The purposes for reviewing the M&A literature are twofold. First, the review of 
the studies presents the general consensus on the meaning of M&A performance and its 
determinants. Second, the interpretation of the underlying assumptions in these prior 
studies helps us understand whether the existing theories are sufficient to answer the 
question I address in this study. On the other hand, the literature review on evolutionary 
theory aims to explicate the theory that I later develop.  
My research makes important contributions to both fields of study: the literature 
on M&A performance and evolutionary theory. By suggesting that routine disruption can 
be helpful for certain types of combinations, I extend possible sources of value creation 
from M&As. I also suggest that an event like an M&A can change combining firms‘ 
internal routines by affecting the variation and selection processes of routines. In doing 
so, I provide a richer theoretical explanation for the conditions under which routines can 
change, and also the relationship between an M&A and firm evolution. 
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2.1. Mergers and Acquisitions 
As M&As become an important means for ﬁrms to expand, and as more and more 
firms engage in this activity, vast amounts of research have been devoted to studying this 
phenomenon (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001). 
Therefore, various explanations for M&A performance have been provided. However, it 
is not my intention to review the vast literature on the determinants of M&A performance 
here. Instead, I will summarize a few representative sources of gains and losses, and then 
the aspects related to M&A that are associated with conflicting theoretical arguments and 
the empirical results developed in financial economics, strategic management, and 
organizational theory. I present the underlying assumptions in these explanations as 
possible reasons as to why the predictions for the same factors are different, depending 
on the field. 
2.1.1. What determines value from M&As? 
Several sources of value creation from M&As have been discussed. First, cost 
efficiency through economies of scale and scope can be achieved by combining two 
firms. Economies of scale is a concept that refers to a reduction in unit cost as the scale of 
a given activity increases. It is realized by rationalizing excessive capacity. Economies of 
scale can be achieved in functional areas such as production, R&D, distribution, 
marketing or administrative activities by spreading fixed costs over an increased total 
volume (Shepherd, 1979).  
Economies of scope is a concept that refers to cost savings as the variety of 
activities increases (Panzar & Willig, 1981). When a firm has indivisible resources, 
combining with another firm that owns overlapping parts allows the firms to spread their 
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resources over a broader range of products. By combining with a competitor, a firm can 
exercise increased market power. Kim and Singal (1993) found that prices increased on 
routes served by merging firms relative to a control group of routes unaffected by the 
merger when they examined price changes associated with airline mergers during 1985-
1988. Two merging firms competing in the same product market have a higher potential 
for market power-related gains than two firms competing in dissimilar product-markets. 
When a firm with market power integrates vertically with another firm with market 
power, it can gain one additional benefit, known as double marginalization. An upstream 
firm can exercise its market power by setting a price that exceeds marginal cost. The 
downstream firm then buys these marked-up inputs and exploits its own market power 
―by applying its own markup - effectively marking up twice the marginal cost of the 
upstream supplier‖ (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2007: 130). Finally, the 
reduction of risk through diversifying shareholders‘ portfolios and information 
asymmetry by identifying undervalued firms are often discussed as sources of value 
creation from M&As.  
2.1.2. Indicator of the sources of value creation  
Here, I briefly review two aspects of M&As that affect value creation from 
M&As and have been studied in different fields with conflicting findings. I suggest that 
such inconclusive results can be resolved by considering the missing moderator or 
alternative sources of value creation from M&As.  
Post-merger management turnover 
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Whether a target firm‘s management stays or leaves after an M&A has been 
considered to affect value creation after an M&A. Two separate streams of research, each 
from financial economics and strategic management, have provided different predictions 
on this issue. Mergers in which the target‘s management is replaced are consistent with a 
managerial-discipline motive, as argued in financial economics. On the other hand, 
mergers in which the target‘s management is retained are consistent with a managerial-
synergy motive, as argued in strategic management. The view in financial economics is 
that acquisitions are transactions that reflect the market for corporate control, and firms 
are taken over to discipline or replace their bad managers. If a particular firm 
underperforms, that firm‘s share price is low since dissatisfied shareholders sell their 
shares, and as a result, its management team is regarded as incompetent (it is not 
maximizing the value of the firm). The management of the firm is regarded as either 
unable or unwilling to make the changes necessary to ensure that the market properly 
values the firm (Almeder & Carey, 1991). A firm with a more competent management 
team vies for control of the assets of underperforming firms; thus, the management team 
takes its place by acquiring the poorly performing firm (Manne, 1965; Jensen & Ruback, 
1983).  
This theory clearly implies that the post-merger retention of executives from the 
target firm is, in general, undesirable. The replacement of the management team by the 
superior team of the acquiring firm is expected to improve the performance of the target 
firm. Empirical work shows that there are positive gains from a combination of the 
acquiring firm‘s and the target firm‘s assets, although most of the gains accrue to 
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shareholders of the target firm, and these results are consistent with what the theory 
implies. 
 Contrary to predictions of the ―market for corporate control‖ approach, research 
in the strategic management field has found that managerial turnover is harmful to M&A 
performance (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). The theoretical argument supporting this 
finding is referred to as the ―managerial-synergy‖ theory (Trautwein, 1990), in which the 
target management is regarded as the key asset in an acquisition; thus, the acquirer‘s 
management wants to work with target management, and not replace it. By taking a view 
of management capability as pre-existing resources within the target firm, replacement or 
simple dismissal of those resources is detrimental to post-merger performance. Instead, 
the skills of target management can be a complementary asset to the acquirer 
management‘s expertise; therefore, it is better if they are retained. Matsusaka‘s (1993) 
finding supports the managerial-synergy theory by showing that the market reacts 
positively to acquirers who retain target management and negatively to acquirers who 
remove target management.  
Opposite predictions and findings from two theories provide us with an 
opportunity to explore the conditions that would moderate the relationship between post-
merger management turnover and performance. The market for corporate control has a 
clear assumption about the pre-merger performance of the acquirer and target as 
performing well and poorly, respectively. Thus, the results from this perspective can be 
rephrased in a way to suggest that it is better to replace the management team of an 
underperforming target firm with a superior management team from the acquiring firm 
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that is performing well. On the other hand, managerial-synergy theory is unclear about 
what kinds of firms can be applied to the theory. This theory is silent as to whether both 
merging parties were initially performing poorly or well, or whether one of them was an 
underperformer or outperformer prior to a merger. For this reason, the two theories are 
not comparable, and further caution is required when comparing them. The consideration 
of pre-merger performance in combining firms makes it possible to include alternative 
sources of value creation – disruption of routine. 
In addition, both theories focus on the target‘s management team. Namely, the 
theories examine only the effect of the executive officers‘ turnover of the target firm, and 
not that of the acquirer. The management team of the acquirer is assumed to be intact, 
although it is not true, in reality. As a result, the two theories are insufficient in providing 
predictions for the effect of management turnover in the acquiring firm.  
Resource relatedness 
Empirical work in the strategic management field has used the resource-based 
perspective of the firm and industrial organization theory to test the effect of relatedness 
on the performance of M&As (Chatterjee, 1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990; Shelton, 
1988; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Although there is still controversy over defining 
―relatedness‖ (Morck & Yeung, 1999), and the debate is at an impasse in the literature, it 
is generally agreed that the conceptual distinction between related and unrelated mergers 
is made by the source of value creation on which a combination is based. More 
specifically, it is considered as an unrelated merger if the value of the combination arises 
from risk diversification rather than cost efficiency. Measuring relatedness is still not an 
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easy task, but the most widespread measure of relatedness is whether two firms compete 
in a similar product market, or whether they have a commonality of functions such as 
R&D, production technology, or marketing, etc. (Seth, 1990). 
Whether merging firms‘ resources are related or unrelated affects merger 
performance by exploiting different potential sources of value creation. Since Rumelt 
(1982)—who found related diversification strategies outperformed other diversification 
strategies on average, researchers with a resource-based perspective have argued for 
positive synergies by expanding into related activities that share similar resources 
(Penrose, 1959). Related mergers provide benefits in the form of economies of scale and 
scope. Commonality of functions, such as R&D, production, marketing, advertising, and 
distribution allows merging firms to exploit benefits through economies of scale and 
scope. Also, related mergers provide benefits arising out of market power. Merging firms 
competing in a similar product market have a higher potential for market power-related 
benefits than firms competing in dissimilar product markets (Seth, 1990). 
On the other hand, based on the diversification literature, some scholars argue for 
the benefit of unrelated mergers. By merging unrelated businesses, firms can pool 
financial resources, and thus behave like a capital market for their business divisions 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2002; Scharfstein, 1998). Additionally, unrelated mergers are 
motivated by a desire to diversify risk by having portfolios of unrelated businesses.  
Researchers have sought to test whether relatedness is better than unrelatedness, 
or vice-versa, and also whether relatedness plays a role in explaining the variance of 
M&A performance. Some find evidence for positive performance implications of the 
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degree of relatedness to the target firm‘s shareholders (Singh & Montgomery, 1987) and 
higher rents for narrowly vs. widely diversified firms (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988), 
while others find that gains to a target firm‘s shareholders in unrelated mergers are 
significantly higher than those in related, non-horizontal mergers (Chatterjee, 1986). 
However, some researchers also observe that there are no significant differences in the 
total combined returns (for the acquirer and target together) between related and 
unrelated mergers (Seth, 1990), and find that horizontal mergers do not outperform 
vertical or conglomerate acquisitions (Lubatkin, 1987). 
The evidence suggests an unclear relationship between relatedness and 
performance, but it does not mean that relatedness is not an important antecedent of 
M&A performance. This lack of consensus has been attributed partly to difficulties in the 
measurement of ―relatedness.‖ Taking methodological difficulties into account, some try 
to clarify this relationship by examining it in a narrow context (e.g., declining industries 
in Anand & Singh, 1997). Others argue that there may be alternative mechanisms for 
improved performance of the combined entity that do not depend on the exploitation of 
economies of scale or scope, and thus would not benefit from higher degrees of 
relatedness between firms (Singh & Zollo, 1999). In this study, I suggest one alternative 
mechanism – disruption of routines.  
2.1.3. Limitations and ways to improve our understanding of M&A 
performance 
It is shown that there exists an abundant amount of literature explaining M&A 
performance variation. There would be little value in another study seeking to identify the 
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conditions that affect M&A performance, if not for two reasons, which form the basis of 
this paper. First, is there a way to reconcile the conflicting results found in prior studies? 
Second, is the conclusion made in prior studies equally valid for all M&As? 
To answer the first question, I suggest considering the alternative sources of value 
creation from M&As. Teece (1982) asks why economies of scope cannot be achieved by 
coordinating several independent firms; that is, why must business units be brought into a 
firm for economies to be realized? He urges us to find a unique source of value from 
M&As that would not be available unless two firms are legally and physically combined. 
I propose that the disruption of routines through M&As can be an alternative source of 
value and is available only when two entities are legally combined. If we assess the value 
of an M&A based on its ability to disrupt routines and change the merging firms, the 
relationship between the factors listed above and performance would be clearer. To 
illuminate this aspect of M&A, I pay attention to a specific issue – the combination of 
two poorly performing firms. This is an ideal setting to test the role of an M&A as an 
impetus for change, as change is desirable for those firms; thus, they have more incentive 
to embrace it. At the same time, the context of merging two poor performers can provide 
an opportunity to explain the conditions under which this somewhat unusual combination 
can be successful.  
Many of the existing arguments preclude why the merger of two struggling firms 
can be beneficial, inasmuch as they are based on some common underlying assumptions. 
The first underlying assumption is that at least one merging party was working well 
before the merger. Consider the market for corporate control. The notion of the market 
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for corporate control assumes that at least an acquiring firm is performing well with a 
competent management team, which can lead to improved efficiency and greater 
shareholder wealth for the target firm. The possibility that a management team of an 
acquirer can also be incompetent is excluded, and for the argument to make sense, it is 
assumed that the acquirer should perform well. Following this logic, value creation from 
combining two incompetent firms cannot be explained.  
On the other hand, managerial-synergy theory is not explicit about its assumption 
on the pre-merger performance of two merging firms. However, we can find a clue that it 
blindly assumes that neither of merging parties was performing poorly prior to the 
merger. Executives from target firms are seen as part of the resources obtained in the 
merger, and are often perceived as valuable (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Pitts, 1976; Walsh 
& Ellwood, 1991). Due to this assumption, the second assumption is inevitable – 
disruption is bad. Therefore, in their study, Cannella and Hambrick (1993: 141) say, ―The 
aftermath of an acquisition is already exceedingly disruptive (Hirsch, 1987) and we 
expect the loss of established leaders to have harmful consequences.‖ This might be 
different in a situation where disruption is no longer harmful to M&A performance. I 
argue that this is true if the combination is between two poor performers. 
 The second assumption is that all sorts of actions (e.g., disruption, replacement, 
change, etc.) occur only in a target firm. For example, the preexisting power and control 
structures in the ―acquired firm” are often completely supplanted in post-acquisition 
periods (Gaddis, 1987). This happens because most research takes the perspective of an 
acquirer when it evaluates the effect of certain factors on M&A performance. In this way, 
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considering the possibility that change or disruption can also occur in an acquirer has 
been underemphasized in the literature.  
The third barrier inhibits the standard approach from explaining M&A 
performance and the success of the merger between two poor performers. Specifically, 
the existing explanations do not consider the possibility that there can be alternative ways 
of value creation when two poor performers combine. The superiority of a related merger 
comes from its ability to exploit economies of scale or scope. Two related ―poor‖ 
performers can still benefit from these sources of value creation by asset divestiture, but 
there remains some doubt since the asset (or resources) left after the divestiture is intact, 
and thus is still susceptible to the failing logic, which has been in the firm before the 
merger. In short, cost efficiency through economies of scale or scope can be a short-term 
benefit that does not contribute to solving the fundamental problems that poorly 
performing merging firms face.  Instead, a combination of unrelated resources provides a 
benefit specific to the combination of poor performers. Unrelatedness is not usually 
conceived as a source of value creation, as risk reduction is rarely valued by shareholders. 
However, a combination of unrelated resources can provide the benefit of disrupting 
routines, which is often considered as a cost in an M&A other than the combination of 
two weak firms. It is important to note that relatedness is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition unless a certain setting is specified, although it has been regarded as a 
necessary condition for good post-merger performance.  The absence of relatedness does 
not mean that the merger will fail, since unrelatedness has an alternative source of value 
creation that does not depend on risk reduction.  
  18 
2.1.4. How do we measure value from M&As? 
In studying M&A phenomena, there exist multiple definitions of M&A 
performance and various approaches to measuring M&A performance, accordingly. In 
their review of M&A research published in top management and finance journals 
between 1970 and 2006, Zollo and Meier (2008) identify 12 different approaches to the 
problem of measuring M&A performance.  Such existing approaches can be grouped in 
many ways (e.g., level of analysis, time horizon, etc.), but the essential distinction is 
whether the approach involves measuring the performance of an M&A per se or the 
overall impact of an M&A on firm performance. Research examining merger 
performance per se investigates integration process-related performance or the 
knowledge-transfer process. Sometimes whether the acquired unit is divested eventually 
is considered as M&A performance.  
On the other hand, research with a broader perspective on M&A performance has 
paid attention to whether the value of the newly combined firm after a merger exceeds 
the sum of the values of the two merging firms when acting independently. In other 
words, instead of the performance of the transaction per se, the contribution of the 
transaction to the firm‘s overall performance is highlighted in this stream. Researchers 
pursuing this stream have typically relied on shareholder returns (i.e., stock market-based 
measures of performance) or a firm‘s operating performance (i.e., accounting-based 
measures of performance).   
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as a stock market-based measure of 
performance using event study methodology and are the most frequently used analytical 
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approach for measuring M&A performance (e.g., Capron & Pistre, 2002; King, Dalton, 
Daily, & Covin, 2004). A large group of studies using this approach takes a short-term 
window to calculate financial returns to the shareholders, but long-term window event 
studies are also growing in popularity in finance journals. Conceptually, abnormal returns 
from a short-term window reflect the market‘s expectations on the value of the M&A.  
Proponents of this measure argue that event study methodology has predictive 
validity – market participants may reasonably forecast subsequent acquisition 
performance (McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992), 
showing a strong, positive relationship between abnormal stock returns at merger 
announcements and post-merger increases in operating cash flows (Healy, Palepu, & 
Ruback, 1992). Abnormal returns might capture long-term performance since changes in 
stock prices around the announcement of an acquisition reflect a change in the 
expectation of future earnings. Indeed, there is some evidence that stock price gains on 
announcements are related to subsequent cash flows (e.g., Healy et al., 1992). On the 
other hand, opponents of this measure argue that short-term event studies capture the 
cognitive heuristics (Duhaime, 1985; Schwenk, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) about 
the announced deal, rather than the objective information on the potential from the 
transaction (Harrison, Oler, & Allen 2005). According to these critics, the market is not 
able to evaluate the real value of the announced deal, and thus its reaction to the 
transaction is systematically wrong. In general, how strongly people believe the market 
efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1991; Jensen & Ruback, 1983) will affect their choice of 
this measure as M&A performance. Due to the weakness of the short-term window event 
  20 
study, some researchers in corporate finance have recently emphasized the use of the 
long-term window (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Loughran & Vijh, 1997).   
Accounting-based measures of M&A performance encompass operating cash 
flows or return on assets (e.g., Ramaswamy, 1997). These measures capture actual firm 
performance rather than the expectation on firm performance. However, there is another 
limitation, since acquisition effects are not immediately realized or reflected in the 
financial statements of the company (Rhoades, 1994). Therefore, many confounding 
factors besides acquisition effects may affect firm performance. 
Whether an M&A contributes to firm performance still remains a controversial 
issue. For example, studies have shown that acquirers on average, experience zero or 
negative short-term abnormal returns at an M&A announcement (e.g., Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005; King et al., 2004), while target firms usually experience 
positive returns. It is worthwhile to note that most of the research in strategic 
management has taken the viewpoint of the acquiring firm, examining financial returns to 
acquiring a company‘s shareholders. This practice makes sense, since the acquirer is 
usually the surviving entity after the merger, and accordingly generates ex-post measures 
of merger performance, comparable to an ex-ante measure of abnormal returns.  
2.2. Evolutionary Theory 
To understand how the disruption of routines can be an alternative source of value 
creation from M&As, it is first necessary to understand evolutionary theory. Here, I 
highlight two parts from this theory – evolutionary process and the concept of routines.  
2.2.1 Process of firm evolution  
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Similar to other organizations, firms evolve, too. Evolutionary theory (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) explains how firms adapt and change, based on their inherited 
characteristics. Firms evolve through the process of variation, selection, and retention. 
Since the theory I will develop later is based on the variation and selection process, I will 
briefly review these two processes. I follow the basic structure of explanation concerning 
the processes in Aldrich and Ruef (2006). Any departure from a routine (which I will 
explain shortly) or an existing way of doing is a variation. Such variations may be 
intentional or blind. Intentional variations occur when organizations attempt to generate 
alternatives and seek solutions to problems. They result from conscious responses to 
difficult situations, planning sessions, advice from outside consultants, and so forth. 
Intentional variations are less likely to deviate from current routines, and firms may be 
under more inertial force in the search for new routines, as the search is guided by higher-
level routines based on past experience. Blind variations, by contrast, occur 
independently of conscious planning. They result from accidents, change, luck, conflict, 
malfeasance, and so forth (Brunsson, 1985; March, 1981). Blind variations are freer from 
inertia. Variations precede selection processes so that the selection criteria choose those 
routines that are most suitable. The higher the frequency is of the variation, whatever its 
source, the greater the opportunities exist for change.  
With the existence of variation as raw materials, the selection process affects the 
firm‘s evolution by differentially selecting or selectively eliminating certain types of 
variations. Although management and business strategy scholars usually focus on 
selection systems that improve environmental fitness, a few internal selectors contribute 
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to the loose coupling of internal selection and environmental fitness. There are pressures 
toward stability and homogeneity (Campbell, 1969). Although the self-reinforcing 
process contributes to organizational stability, it can also lead to competency traps that 
inhibit the discovery of potentially adaptive alternatives (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Secondly, there is the persistence of past selection criteria that are no longer relevant in a 
new environment (Campbell, 1994). Procedures that were once selected because they fit 
the context may be irrelevant, or even maladaptive to the current situation. Nevertheless, 
members may simply continue doing what they know best rather than search for more 
effective options. Finally, there may be the willingness of some organizational founders 
and leaders to accept a low performance threshold. Owners differ in the threshold of 
performance they are willing to accept (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). 
Mechanisms through which variations are created and selections are made are 
susceptible to path-dependence. Unless variations are blinded, there is always the 
possibility that people follow past experience rather than search for new routines. 
Although new routines are introduced through the variation process, past selection 
criteria may reject new routines. As a result, the evolutionary argument stresses that a 
firm‘s irreversible investments and limited range of operating routines constrain its 
ability to develop and use capabilities within the firm. Indeed, firms tend to develop 
proximate capabilities that do not disrupt their existing routines and processes (Cyert & 
March, 1963). For example, Helfat (1994) finds path-dependence in a firm‘s R&D 
investment, which reflects incremental, localized adaptations, as firms search for new 
knowledge primarily in the neighborhood of their current knowledge bases. Path-
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dependence found in a firm‘s evolutionary process is largely attributed to the nature of 
routines, which will be reviewed below. 
2.2.2 Routine 
Evolutionary theory has put the concept of routines center-stage (Becker, 2004). 
Routines refer to repeated patterns of behavior bound by cognitive regularities (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). They range from well-specified technical 
processes for producing things, to less specific processes such as hiring and firing 
procedures, or policies for R&D (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Beyond defining what an 
organization can do, routines define what the organization knows, and the writings in this 
area tend not to distinguish between knowledge and action (Levitt & March, 1988; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982). Routines are embedded in an organization and its structures 
(Cohen et al., 1996; Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Madhok, 1997; Teece & Pisano, 1994). 
Organizations are temporary repositories of competencies and routines. As organizational 
memory (Nelson & Winter, 1982), routines are to the organizational level what skills are 
to the individual level (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2002). Organizations can be efficient 
structures for collective action, owing to routines (March & Simon, 1958). Moreover, 
routines guide searches and reduce the space of behavioral options that managers should 
scan (Shapira, 1994; Winter, 1985). In addition, they economize on the limited 
information processing and decision-making capacity of managers.  
Organizations are likely to behave in the future according to previously used 
routines. Today‘s operating routines restrict an organization‘s available procedures to 
producing outputs, acquiring resources, selecting among lower-level routines, and 
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coordinating the activities of its members (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 109). Routines are 
persistent, heritable, and selectable ―in the sense that organisms with certain routines may 
do better than others‖ (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 14). As the basis for competitive 
advantage in a particular market or markets (Dosi & Teece, 1998), firm routines affect a 
firm‘s performance. Therefore, a firm‘s routines can be viewed as either valuable assets 
or constraints for the firm, depending on its performance. In other words, profitable 
routines are regarded as valuable, due to their outcomes, whereas unprofitable routines 
are criticized as a source of bad performance. Although firms have unprofitable routines, 
changing such routines is formidable and unlikely.  
Path-dependence is a very important characteristic of routines. The literature has 
repeatedly revealed the persistence and inflexibility of firm routines. These routines 
change in a path-dependent manner (David, 1997) and are shaped by history. Therefore, 
organizations‘ behaviors are path-dependent in that organizations are likely to behave in 
the future following previously used routines. Given that routines are the basis of 
organizations, the path-dependence of routines contributes to the stability of 
organizations. However, the same nature of routines also leads to inertia. Although theory 
says that organizations start to find another way to achieve a task if an existing routine 
gives unsatisfactory results (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958), routines often 
persist despite negative performance feedback (Rumelt, 1995) since individuals often 
follow routines without devoting attention to them, and accordingly, the feedback is 
ignored. Exploitation processes can drive out exploration processes, thereby making it 
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difficult to develop new capabilities (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Burgelman, 1994; 
March, 1991).  
Nevertheless, the literature acknowledges that routines can change. Routines can 
be simple rule-following behaviors at one point of time, but can involve adaptive and 
creative behaviors at another point in time (Becker, 2004). In his analysis of the 
documentation of a historical airplane disaster, Weick arrived at the conclusion that 
routines can be disrupted when participants in a routine start ―acting in a manner that is 
more individual than collective‖ (Weick, 1990: 579). Although aspiration levels are 
known to be a powerful form of an actor-related trigger of routines (Cyert & March, 
1963; Levinthal & March, 1981), we still know very little about the conditions under 
which changes in routines occur. My theory in this paper attempts to complement this 
lack of knowledge. 
2.3. Related Studies 
The research question I address in this study is, ―Under what conditions can the 
combination of two poorly performing firms create value?‖ As seen in section 2.1.3, the 
underlying assumptions in the existing explanations for M&A performance preclude 
them from adequately addressing this question, since the setting – the merger of two 
weak parties— is a unique circumstance that falls outside of these assumptions. Although 
there is no study that directly answers this question to my knowledge, there are some 
related pieces to this study. 
In an effort to explain the variation of M&A performance, researchers have tried 
several ways to classify M&A deals and relate the gains from a merger to the type of 
deals. For example, some scholars classify the deals in terms of the level of relatedness 
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between an acquirer and a target firm, as seen above, while others do so determining 
whether the deal is made within a country or across countries (Harris & Ravenscraft, 
1991). Among these methods, researchers in financial economics employ the pre-merger 
profitability of both an acquirer and a target as a criterion to classify M&A deals.  
For example, Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1989) divide their sample between high q 
firms (those with a q ratio in excess of one) and low q firms to explore how the bidder‘s 
and the target‘s announcement period abnormal returns are related to the bidder and 
target q ratios. They find that tender offers associated with the largest increase in the 
combined value of the bidder and target equity are undertaken by high q bidders for low q 
targets, while tender offers that have the smallest total combined gain are generated from 
a combination of low q bidders and high q targets. This is consistent with Jovanovic and 
Rousseau‘s (2002) point that firms with a high q can profitably expand by buying assets. 
Using a different cut-off of the industry average rather than ―one‖2 and larger samples, 
including both mergers and tender offers rather than just tender offers, Servaes (1991) 
mostly confirms Lang et al.‘s (1989) results. These findings imply that better performing 
firms also make better acquisitions, and that more value can be created from taking over 
poorly performing companies.  
In addition to the fact that Lang et al. (1989) employ a new way of looking at the 
variation of M&A performance, what is more interesting is that the pair of a low q bidder 
and a low q target in their sample generates the second best outcome in all types of 
                                                 
2
 Lang, et al.‘s (1989) motivation for this cut-off is partially based on the fact that under certain 
circumstances, firms with q ratios below one have marginal projects with negative net present 
values. However, q is also industry specific, and one may argue that managers should not be held 
responsible for adverse shocks to their industries. As such, the industry average may be a useful 
alternative cut-off point to separate high q firms from low q firms.  
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returns – bidders‘, targets‘, and combined returns3. Specifically, while the pairs of low q 
bidders and high q targets are always ranked lowest in all types of returns, the pairs of 
low q bidders and low q targets are always ranked second, being ahead of the pairs of 
high q bidders and high q targets (in both the bidder and combined gains) and the pairs of 
high q bidders and low q targets (in the target gain).  
This result is quite surprising, considering the conventional view on the 
combination of two weak firms. Although Lang et al. (1989) attribute the difference in 
returns from different types of pairs to management capability
4
 (e.g., the total takeover 
gain is highest for tender offers by well-managed bidders for poorly managed targets), 
they do not provide an explanation as to why the combination of two low q firms could 
sometimes be better than pairs including one high q firm, which seems to be inconsistent 
with their interpretation of the best and worst case. In this study, by bringing in a new 
source of value creation from an M&A – an impetus for change through the disruption of 
routines, I attempt to explain the success of combining two low q firms. 
                                                 
3
 These are also true in Servaes (1991), except for the bidder‘s returns. In Servaes (1991), the 
combination of a low q bidder and a low q target generates the second worst (i.e., third best) 
outcome for the bidder‘s returns.   
4
 ―Tobin‘s q is an increasing function of the market‘s assessment of management‘s performance‖ 
(Lang, et al., 1989: 145). 
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Chapter 3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
When a firm is performing relatively poorly compared to its industry counterparts, 
managers of a firm are inclined to change what they have been doing to turn around poor 
performance. A firm, as a bundle of routines from the evolutionary perspective, draws 
upon routines for its performance (Dosi & Teece, 1998). Therefore, a firm‘s 
transformation typically begins with a break from existing routines. In other words, 
poorly performing firms can be better off if they change their unprofitable routines.  
Although firms have unprofitable routines, changing existing routines is 
formidable and unlikely. The literature has repeatedly revealed the persistence and 
inflexibility of firm routines. The cognitive assumption of the routine-based perspective 
is bounded rationality, featured in the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 
1963), which is an important forerunner to the work on evolutionary economics by 
Nelson and Winter (1982). People often follow a routine without much ongoing 
consideration about the costs and benefits of the constituent elements of this routine. 
Firms experience resistance to change, as it is often opposed by organizational members 
(Coch & French, 1948). In the behavioral theory of a firm, a search is local and ―simple-
minded,‖ learning takes the form of trial-and-error, and adaptations are induced by crises. 
Evolutionary explanations of change emphasize the role of external catalysts, 
because evolutionary processes create internal selection systems promoting persistence 
rather than change. With respect to this notion, studies have shown that threat can unlock 
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inertia by motivating change (Huff, Huff, & Thomas, 1992; Lant, Milliken, & Bartra, 
1992).   
In this study, I argue that an event, such as a merger, can be a catalyst for firms 
and can function as an impetus for change in two ways. First, if a firm is defined as a 
bundle of routines, merging two firms means the combination of two distinct sets of 
routines. When two separate organizational routines that had previously defined the way 
of doing things within their respective firms come together, it is inevitable for them to 
collide to a certain degree and generate new routines by recombining existing routines 
from two firms. Collision between two different sets of routines generates various results 
spanning from the dominance of one firm‘s routines to the abolition of both firms‘ 
routines. In this way, a merger can interrupt and disrupt firms‘ internal systems.  
Second, mergers can be an impetus for change by affecting the evolutionary 
processes of routines – creating more diverse variation and shifting selection criteria5. 
The higher the frequency is of the variation, whether intentional or blind, the greater the 
opportunities exist for change.  Under normal conditions, creating variations are difficult, 
and variations that lie outside current practices are mostly overlooked, ignored, or 
negatively sanctioned. Nonetheless, potential sources of variation that break with routine 
are present (Aldrich, 1979), and mergers can serve as this source of variation. Although 
more variations occur, they do not play a useful role in inducing change unless a new 
variation is selected.  
                                                 
5
 Shifting selection criteria implies ―generating changes in internal diffusion, imitation, 
promotion, and incentive systems‖ (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 141). 
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Consistent selection criteria generally promote organizational reproduction by 
differentially selecting certain types of variations. Accordingly, for an avenue to be open 
to new practices, selection criteria should shift so that some variations that previously 
proved more beneficial than others are no longer positively selected. Explanations of 
organizational transformation typically begin with a search for discontinuity that has 
undercut support for existing selection criteria, such as a change in competitive 
conditions, new government regulations, a turnover in leadership, or a technological 
breakthrough (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). In this study, I argue that merging with another 
firm can provide these changes that undercut support for existing selection criteria.   
Whereas a number of scholars have observed that M&As create value through 
cost efficiency or risk reduction, studies have not paid enough attention to the possibility 
of mergers creating value for certain firms by enabling change. Here are a few exemplary 
studies that have illuminated such alternative sources of value creation from M&As. 
Amburgey and his colleagues find that M&As can provide momentum for organizational 
transformation (Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Acquisitions are 
important vehicles for corporate strategic redirection and renewal (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986). Firms pursue very aggressive boundary expansion strategies, appearing to gain 
momentum as they acquire other firms.  
Another line of research argues that M&As, as a mechanism to mine new 
capabilities, help firms develop new capabilities that both guard against obsolescence and 
resolve organizational inertia (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Vermeulen & Barkema, 
2001). In this study, I emphasize the role of a merger as an enabler of change. Following 
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the evolutionary definition of a firm and a merger, I adopt the definition of change as the 
disruption of existing routines, and I explore how such a disruption of routines can be 
achieved through mergers. Here, the disruption of routine is specifically defined as a 
situation in which the resulting firm has new routines that are different from either of the 
pre-merger firms. New routines can be created by a novel recombination of existing 
routines from merging firms and the introduction of new routines from outside. 
Any kind of disruption through mergers is usually regarded as negative since 
disruption, by definition, means destroying the inherent value within individual 
businesses. Therefore, managers perceive disruption as something that should be 
prevented or minimized in the process of mergers. This is more so if mergers include at 
least one well-performing firm. Because well-performing firms have routines that already 
create value, the competitive value of novelty may not be large enough; thus, the 
disruption of existing routines may not be necessary for them.  
On the other hand, change is desirable for underperformers, as their current 
routines do not generate substantial value. Therefore, the competitive value of the novelty 
that may be achieved by the disruption of underlying routines can be greater in a merger 
between underperformers whose routines are not working effectively. Unlike the 
conventional wisdom that a combination of two poor performers will not work well 
because they will continue what they have been doing prior to the merger, struggling 
firms may have a strong incentive to exploit the potential of a merger as an impetus for 
change.  This is why mergers between two underperformers are a desirable context to 
examine whether a merger helps combining firms break with their past routines. If firms 
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do not have a strong incentive to utilize the merger as an opportunity to transform 
themselves – as in the case of a merger including at least one strong firm — it is difficult 
to uncover the potential of a merger as momentum for change since the disruption of 
routines is blocked at the source. For this reason, I choose a specific type of merger – the 
combination of two poor performers – as the context of this study. 
Although a merger has the potential to be an impetus for change, and neither of 
the two combining underperformers is against pursuing such a potential, the occurrence 
of a merger in and of itself does not guarantee that the potential is realized. Two crippled 
firms may merely end up being a bigger-sized crippled entity unless certain conditions 
are met. Depending on the deal characteristics, firms‘ routines can be even more 
solidified or disrupted. In this study, I argue that the sources of path-dependence should 
be shaken to break the firms from the past. Three types of sources are suggested: a top 
management team, a power structure, and resources. Types of changes made to each 
source, accompanied with the merger, affect the evolutionary processes, and thus 
determine whether the existing routines are disrupted. If the sources of path-dependence 
experience changes in a way so that more variation is created and selection criteria are 
shifted, such a deal would help disrupt existing routines.  
In the particular context of mergers between two struggling firms, I expect that 
such indicators of routine disruptions would generally lead to improved performance 
after a merger. This does not exclude the possibility that disruption of routines can 
actually harm firm performance. The disruption of current routines refers to a firm‘s 
break from the past and doing something different, but not necessarily better than the 
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past. Therefore, the disruption of existing routines itself does not guarantee value creation 
manifested by improved performance after a merger. The disruption of existing routines 
can make weak firms even worse.  In other words, a break from the past cannot be a 
sufficient condition for performance improvement, even in the case of merging two poor 
performers.  
However, what is clear is that a break with existing routines is a necessary 
condition for achieving more profitable routines, leading to better performance. It is 
obvious that two weak firms cannot improve their performance if they do not change 
what they have been doing. The absence of routine disruption inhibits performance 
increase, whereas routine disruption does not automatically lead to performance 
improvement; thus, the disruption of routines after a merger is a necessary condition for 
performance improvement when weak firms are combined. The necessary conditions do 
not identify when the merger will perform well. They only identify when the merger 
cannot perform well and provide guidance as to when mergers have the potential to 
perform well. In conclusion, I predict a positive relationship between routine disruption 
and performance improvement. 
On the other hand, for a group of mergers, including at least one strong firm, the 
disruption of routines is neither a necessary, nor sufficient condition for performance 
improvement. Such mergers can still generate good performance in the absence of routine 
disruption, whereas the disruption of routines would not necessarily hurt. It is also 
possible that performance from the mergers of strong firms can be improved by the 
disruption of routines. Given the lack of clear direction in the relationship between the 
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disruption of routines and performance in the case of mergers – including at least one 
well-performing firm – no formal prediction for such cases is made in this study.  
I develop these ideas further and propose a set of testable hypotheses in the 
following section. Given that the disruption of routines is a necessary condition for 
performance improvement in the case of mergers between poor performers, I explore 
how firms can disrupt their routines through mergers. As explained earlier, three sources 
of path-dependence should be tackled in order to bring about the disruption of routines. I 
propose that with more routine disruption, better performance is generated when 1) the 
proportion of outsiders in the post-merger management team (or board of directors) is 
higher; 2) the power is balanced between the two merging entities; and 3) the combining 
resources are unrelated. 
3.1. Influx of Outsiders into Post-merger Management Team and Board of Directors 
Firms, as organizations, are characterized by a central authority and hierarchical 
control, allowing top management to create viable organizational alternatives in terms of 
incentive systems, formal rules, or planning procedures (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 
2009). A few streams of research share an underlying premise that managers matter, and 
a linkage exists between the top executives of a firm and its strategy and performance. 
Cyert and March (1963) conceive a firm‘s top management team as the ―dominant 
coalition‖ of individuals that sets a firm‘s direction by formulating the major strategies 
and allocating resources. Hambrick and Mason‘s (1984) upper echelon perspective 
suggests that organizations are a reflection of powerful actors in the organization; that is, 
leaders make decisions that reflect their own perspectives, which in turn, shape 
organizations in ways that resemble their views on risk, strategy, culture, and so on.  
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The top executives of a firm have two aspects. On the one hand, the way that 
executives make decisions is a routinized process, and these managerial routines are often 
considered as one of the main intangible assets that firms own. One of the motives behind 
mergers is often a desire to acquire capable chief executives from other firms.  
On the other hand, leadership is normally a source of inertia (Rumelt, 1995). Not 
only do executives have their own ways of doing things (managerial routines in decision-
making), but they are also attached to other existing routines in the firm. Top executives 
are committed to the status quo for several reasons. Executives often rely on a learned 
pattern of responses that is structurally and cognitively reinforced instead of based on 
employing new search efforts (March & Simon, 1958).  If the incumbent executives are 
the architects of the status quo, they may feel a special attachment to it, as well as having 
a deep appreciation for its (original) functionality (Rumelt, 1995). For instance, in their 
analysis of the Intel case, Burgelman and Grove (1996:15) found that ―emotional 
attachment on the part of the top management to the business‖ was intertwined with 
inertial self-perceptions. Furthermore, major change requires managers to deny prior 
commitments, thus lessening their ability to lead in the future. Hence, leadership is very 
inert to the status quo. 
Given the role of top executives in the firm and their inert nature, it is inferred 
that the role of the top management team is important for a firm to change. Sydow et al. 
(2009) argue that in order for a firm to change, it is required to switch to a new regime of 
rules mandated by a change agent or a project group. For change to begin, the leadership 
must articulate a vision for change, alter incentives, take direct action where possible, and 
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shift power. Turnaround strategies typically include removal of the extant management 
(Bibeault, 1982; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). 
If renewal in the top executive team is important for change, the type of renewal 
should be considered. Executive succession is one way of renewal made to the executive 
cadre. Succession can be done by insiders or outsiders. Research has generally reached 
the consensus that succession by insiders is not helpful for overcoming a firm‘s path-
dependence. Scholars support this view by distinguishing succession into two types. If 
the succession occurs within the rules accepted in an organization or in an expected way, 
it is merely a turnover within an authority structure rather than a transformation (Cannella 
& Lubatkin, 1993). However, non-routine succession, such as top executives being 
forced out before reaching retirement age or apparent heirs being passed over for 
outsiders, may signal a major corporate restructuring (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Haveman, 
1993). The assertion that insiders are susceptible to inertia, unlike outsiders, is 
strengthened by the relationship between the length of executives‘ tenure and the degree 
of their inertia. Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993) find that executive teams 
having longer relative tenure within an organization and industry are more likely to 
experience a commitment to the status quo than executive teams having shorter relative 
tenure. The longer tenured teams are more likely to remain fixed to a course of action and 
are less likely to change strategies than their shorter tenured counterparts.  
On the other hand, successions by outsiders have been considered to facilitate 
breaks from the past. Grusky (1969) and Helmich and Brown (1972) report that 
successions involving outsiders are more disruptive than those involving insiders. The 
  37 
fact that insiders are less able or eligible to execute change than outsiders is also apparent 
in the well-known notion of the market for corporate control. When a firm suffers from 
poor performance, its incompetent management team (which is considered as unable to 
change the situation by themselves) is disciplined by a firm that has superior management 
capability (i.e., outsiders) through mergers and acquisitions. Here, an acquiring firm‘s 
management team works as outsiders who are not locked in unprofitable routines of the 
target firm and who can bring in its superior routines. The substitution of human capital 
in a top management team with that of an acquiring firm clearly indicates the substitution 
of routines (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Walsh, 1988). In addition, there is evidence that 
a financial market favors firms governed by outsiders, as insider-dominated firms have 
been considered as captured by managers, freeing them to pursue non-value-creating 
objectives. Matsusaka (1993) finds that the market reaction to a takeover announcement 
is negatively related to the ratio of insiders to outsiders on the bidder‘s board of directors. 
This finding implies that outsiders take relatively neutral positions due to their lack of 
long embeddedness in the firm. Also, turnaround strategies typically include removal of 
the extant management (Bibeault, 1982; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). 
When two struggling firms are merged, neither of the two management teams is 
eligible to discipline the other firm since both of them are suffering from poor 
performance. The executives retained from the two firms would be more attached to the 
routines they had in their prior firms. Even when it is implicitly agreed on what both 
firms need, managerial path-dependence constrains executives‘ ability to discard their 
familiar routines and look for new routines. Instead, executives who are sourced 
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externally (from outside the two firms)
6
 are more likely to disrupt the two firms‘ existing 
routines since they are free from both routines. Although it might be possible that the 
executives from outside can be affected by other insiders‘ proclivity toward existing 
routines, they might infuse their own experiences and perspectives so that breaks from 
the existing routines of the two firms can occur anyway. This view is supported by the 
prior finding that external succession creates more disruption than internal succession 
(Helfat & Bailey, 2005). Because top executives will not accept a deal that eventually 
plans to drop them, these arguments have implications for corporate governance in terms 
of actions taken to align agents and principals‘ interests. For example, if boards of 
directors desire to promote this kind of merger, they may need to provide special 
incentives for the top managers not to resist the merger (e.g., attractive severance 
packages, promises of stock in the integrated firm).  
The reason as to why an influx of outsiders (when a new top management team is 
composed through a merger) can bring change to the firm is that they can stir up variation 
and selection processes with their different perspectives, and they have no dependence on 
the routines of a firm. Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder (1994) argue that firms can 
introduce intentional variation through outside consultants, who often play a role in 
spreading new managerial practices, such as total quality management. Also new 
managers often try to look good by reorganizing things, and blind variation can occur in 
that process. Not only can they create more variation, but also outsiders shift selection 
                                                 
6
 The influx of outsiders into a top management team after mergers and acquisitions is not a mere 
imaginary situation. From the data I collected, about 30% of cases could be classified as such 
deals with outsiders. See Table 1 for an example from the merger between Phone.com and 
Software.com. In this example, a new CEO after the merger came from the outside. 
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criteria. For variation to be consequential, new selection criteria should be chosen 
because consistent selection criteria generally promote the reproduction of routines by 
selecting certain types of variation.  
Therefore, I argue that an influx of outside members into a top management team 
of a newly created entity will be likely to lead to more disruption of routines. As a result, 
the more dominated by outsiders a new merged entity is, the more improved performance 
is expected when two poor performers are combined. Conversely, an influx of outsiders 
into a post-merger management team is not a necessary condition for performance 
improvement if the merger includes at least one strong firm, even if it would not 
necessarily hurt either of them. Therefore, no formal prediction for such cases in terms of 
an influx of outsiders is made here. 
Hypothesis 1a: In mergers of poor performers, the more outsiders in the new top 
management team, the higher the post-merger performance.  
The same logic applies to the composition of a board of directors in a newly 
created firm and the post-merger performance.  
Hypothesis 1b: In mergers of poor performers, the more outsiders in the new 
board of directors, the higher the post-merger performance.  
3.2. Power Balance 
 Power is defined here as ―the capacity of individual actors to exert their will‖ 
(Finkelstein, 1992: 506).  This definition is consistent with those of other scholars 
(Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; MacMillan, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981). 
The distribution of intra-organizational power and influence can affect transformation 
and change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
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A power differential is often found between two entities after a merger. Such a 
differential reflects the extent to which there can be unidirectionality of influence from an 
acquirer to a target (Stahl, Kremershof, & Larsson, 2011). The impact of a power 
differential between two entities involved in a merger ―is not simply the overwhelming 
and domination of the smaller entity through sheer magnitude, but also the intensification 
of beliefs about superiority and inferiority‖ (Pablo, 1994: 810). If power is shared 
unequally between merging firms, the more powerful party becomes dominant, and the 
dominant party will stick to its own routines while discarding the routines of the other 
party and imposing its routines on the recessive party. There is evidence that having a 
dominant party is not helpful for variation. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) find that 
dominant groups may constrain opportunities for variation to prevent challenges to their 
power and privilege. In addition, powerful groups may promote interpretive principles 
that shape people‘s perceptions of what is necessary and possible (Burns & Dietz, 1992; 
Perrow, 1986).  Likewise, the selection criteria would be chosen by the dominant party, 
which would continue to solidify the routines of the dominant party.   
On the contrary, symmetry in power will generate a situation in which there is no 
relatively dominant party. In such a situation, both parties will insist upon their own 
routines to operations in a newly established firm, and a collision of two parties‘ routines 
in some areas will be inevitable. In this case, no one party‘s bundle of routines can rule a 
new firm due to equally matched power between the two parties. A clash of routines will 
make both parties depart from their current routines to a certain degree; thus, the two 
parties will experience a disruption of their existing routines.  
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The power of two parties is indicated by a proportion of people from each firm 
who takes positions in the top management team (or a board of directors) of a newly 
formed firm. Considering the impact that top executives usually have on the organization, 
it is obvious to expect that the party with most of the positions in the management team 
will be in control of a new firm. Other than the positions taken by outsiders, the rest of 
the positions in the top management team are filled by people either from an acquirer or a 
target firm. How such remaining positions are divided between the two parties indicates 
the power distribution between them. When a new management team is composed 
following a merger, the executive members from an acquiring firm usually take a greater 
part of the positions in a resulting management team. If this is the case, an acquirer, as the 
dominant party in the firm, is expected to impose its own routines on the new firm. After 
the merger is completed, managers of the acquired firm continue to operate the firm as 
they did previously. A target, with fewer seats in the management team, does not have 
enough power to offset the acquirer‘s dominance in terms of routines.  
Finkelstein (1992) presents a set of dimensions (structural power, ownership 
power, expert power, prestige power) measuring top managers‘ power and suggests a 
measurement methodology to facilitate empirical inquiry. Because his study concerns 
examining power accrued to individual managers, it is not appropriate to apply the 
suggested measures directly to this study. Nevertheless, his insight behind the measures is 
noteworthy. One of the Finkelstein‘s dimensions relevant to this study is structural 
power. Finkelstein (1992) explains structural power as being related with the distribution 
of formal positions within an organization. Based on such an insight, I deem the 
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proportion of the executive positions (excluding the positions taken by outsiders) taken 
by each firm (i.e., acquirer and target firm) to show the size of the power that accrues to 
each entity. 
If executive positions in a new management team are shared more equally, it 
indicates a balanced distribution of power between two parties in a newly combined firm. 
For the reasons argued above, equal representation indicating a power balance between 
two parties will lead to more of a disruption of the two firms‘ routines. In addition, equal 
representation implies that the top management team has more diversity in its 
composition. More diverse teams are believed to challenge each other, push for creative 
solutions, and innovate more (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 
1996).  
Given that a balanced disruption is necessary for performance improvement in a 
merger between poor performers, a merged firm with a balanced power structure will be 
more likely to improve its performance. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship 
between equal representation and post-merger performance. Again, a power balance 
between two parties is not a necessary condition for performance improvement if the 
merger includes at least one strong firm, even if it would not necessarily hurt either of 
them. Therefore, no formal prediction for such cases in terms of power balance is made 
here. 
 Hypothesis 2a: In mergers of poor performers, the more equal the representation 
in the new top management team, the higher the post-merger performance.  
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The same logic applies to the composition of a board of directors in a newly 
created firm and the post-merger performance.  
Hypothesis 2b: In mergers of poor performers, the more equal the representation 
in the new board of directors, the higher the post-merger performance.  
Another indicator of power is a firm‘s size. The size differential between 
acquiring and acquired organizations will influence the post-acquisition process (Bastien 
& Van de Ven, 1986). Studies have been using size difference as a proxy for power 
differential (Asquith, Bruner & Mullins, 1983; Bastien & Van de Ven, 1986; Finkelstein 
& Haleblian, 2002). The relative size of the acquiring and target firms indicates the 
relative power balance among the parties involved. The relative size of acquiring and 
acquired organizations indicates the relative power balance among the organizations 
involved. Specifically, the greater the mismatch in size, the more asymmetrical or 
unidirectional will be the transmission of organizational routines, from the larger to the 
smaller firm. When the acquirer is significantly larger than the target firm, the capability 
and tendency of the acquiring firm to exercise power and enforce its preferences upon the 
target is particularly strong (Pablo, 1994).  
On the other hand, the greater the size equality, the greater the contest and 
bidirectional influence of the target and acquiring firms on each other (Bastien & Van de 
Ven, 1986). In the same manner with equal representation, when similar-sized parties are 
combined (i.e., a merger of equals), a power struggle usually occurs (Epstein, 2004). 
Most of the integration literature implies that a small unit is folded into a larger one when 
there is a significant difference in the sizes of the two firms. When two equally sized 
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firms are merged, one-sided integration would not happen, since both of them can 
influence the other to an equal degree. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between 
size equality and post-merger performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: In mergers of poor performers, the greater the size similarity of 
the merging firms, the higher the post-merger performance.  
3.3. Relatedness 
I have just argued that the composition of a top management team and a board of 
directors after a merger influences the magnitude of change and merger performance, as a 
result. Changes in firms of any size, however, involve more than merely commanding 
change. It is unrealistic to assume that the evolution of a firm is completely under 
management‘s control. Although a top management team or a board of directors has a 
dominant effect over its firm, the scope for a firm to unlock path-dependence simply by 
order is clearly limited, due to the self-reinforcing nature of organizational processes 
(Sydow et al., 2009). Resources composing a firm are another factor affecting firm 
change. Capabilities or routines are tangible or intangible processes that develop through 
interactions with the firm‘s resources (Capron & Mitchell, 2009). More specifically, the 
level of resource overlap (e.g., industry overlap, geography overlap) between the two 
parties affects the degree of unbiased routine disruption.  
The level of relatedness between two entities‘ resources affects the way the 
resources are utilized. Merging firms with overlapping resources creates value through 
exploitation, whereas those with unrelated resources usually do so through exploration 
(Madhok, 1997). Such a difference in the way value is created results in a different effect 
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on variation and selection processes. When similar resources are combined, firms are 
more likely to stick to the same method to make use of those resources, and thus end up 
adhering to the accompanying existing routines. It is less likely that a variation of 
routines occurs, or selection criteria shift.  
Industry is the reservoir of unique resources (Powell, 1996). Firms within the 
same industry share similar resources and routines that are unique to the industry. 
Therefore, if two firms are from the same industry (e.g., Wells Fargo and Wachovia), the 
choice will be made between Wells Fargo‘s and Wachovia‘s ways since both parties‘ 
routines have been aligned within the same environment (i.e., the banking industry), in 
terms of where the merged firm will operate; thus, the merged firm would not feel the 
need to create variations. With no variation, selection merely becomes a process of 
choosing between two firms‘ routines; as a consequence, the firm‘s current routines are 
not disrupted. Also, firms that compete in the same industry share common frames of 
reference (Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999), standard procedures and communication 
channels (Henderson & Clark, 1990), and recipes on strategic thinking (Spender, 1989). 
In sum, familiarity with resources leads managers to routinely continue to work with the 
same resources (Karim & Mitchell, 2004). Resource rigidity positively affects routine 
rigidity (Gilbert, 2005).  
On the other hand, obtaining new stocks of resources contribute to obtaining new 
capabilities or routines (Capron & Mitchell, 2010). By altering the firm‘s resource base, 
new strategic alternatives or ―paths‖ for the firm are open (Helfat, 1997). If two merging 
firms combine unrelated resources within a newly merged entity, each entity needs to 
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handle its unfamiliarity with the resources, and both of them should put effort into 
exploring the new combination of these resources in their hands. Therefore, firms in such 
conditions are more likely to create value through exploring new alternatives. In the 
process of exploration, the environment in which the resulting entity belongs becomes 
different from both environments where each firm had originally belonged prior to the 
merger.  
Neither of the old routines in the two firms is likely to be aligned with the new 
environment. Therefore, variations will start. In addition, changes in terms of which 
resources are available may create new selection pressures (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). For 
example, if two merging firms are from different industries (e.g., Circuit City and 
Blockbuster), a combined firm will operate in a new market, and will thus face new 
competitors that are different from the players in the industries to which they originally 
belonged (e.g., Best Buy or Hollywood). In such a case, the merged firm should come up 
with new routines that can fit a new environment while breaking from both firms‘ 
previous routines at the same time. Increased diversity through combining unrelated 
resources creates alternative opportunities for learning and capability building.  
For poor performers, related combinations are undesirable. Firms that remain 
within one industry have a narrow range of challenges and, as a consequence, learn less 
and are more likely to experience blind spots and holes in knowledge structures (Walsh, 
1995). Firms with highly similar resources also have highly similar strategic capabilities 
and vulnerabilities in the marketplace (Chen, 1996). Therefore, if two struggling firms in 
the same industry merge, it is likely to double similarly unprofitable routines. However, it 
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is hard to expect that the disruption of any of the routines will happen, for the reasons 
argued above. Given that the disruption of routines is necessary for performance 
improvement in a merger between poor performers, a merged firm with related resources 
will be less likely to improve performance after the merger. Instead, the combination of 
unrelated resources can, in fact, provide a positive influence on performance. Again, 
resource differences between the two parties are not a necessary condition for 
performance improvement if the merger includes at least one strong firm, even if it does 
not necessarily hurt either of them. Therefore, no formal prediction for such cases in 
terms of resource overlap is made here. In this study, I employ two measures for resource 
overlap: industry overlap and geographic overlap. 
Hypothesis 3a: In mergers of poor performers, the higher the industry overlap, 
the lower the post-merger performance.  
Hypothesis 3b: In mergers of poor performers, the higher the geographic overlap, 
the lower the post-merger performance.  
The theoretical relationships discussed so far are shown in Figure 1.  
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Chapter 4. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Sample 
To form the sample, I used the Thompson Securities Data Corporation Platinum 
Mergers and Acquisitions database as the source of acquisitions data. The database 
provides a comprehensive list of mergers and acquisitions by companies across countries, 
and many previous academic studies on M&As have used this source (e.g., Puranam, 
Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007).  
I initially gathered all M&A agreements between US firms announced between 
1/1/1994 and 12/31/2006. The 1994 – 2006 period was chosen for the following reasons. 
First, researchers who use the SDC M&A database have reported that pre-1990 data are 
very patchy and not reliable (SRI, 2009). Second, the nature of M&As became different 
as the fifth merger wave started from 1992 in the US. Unlike the deals of the 1980s, those 
of the 1990s gave more importance to strategy than quick financial gains, and they were 
not dependent on much debt. Therefore, there was not much pressure to quickly sell 
assets to pay down debts (Gaughan, 2007). Third, SEC filings – data sources for 
explanatory variables, which will be explained in more detail below- are available only 
after 1/1/1994. Fourth, to allow for a minimum assimilation period of 3 years, the sample 
was restricted to those deals that were completed by 12/31/2007.  
The SDC M&A database lists 333,798 completed M&A deals within this time 
span. From this initial list of M&As, I excluded any form of deal,
7
 except for mergers and 
                                                 
7
 The SDC assigns one code out of ten to each transaction, describing the specific form of the 
transaction: M (Merger), A (Acquisition), AM (Acquisition of Majority Interest), AP (Acquisition 
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acquisitions of stocks or assets. Also, the sample was limited to publicly traded firms so 
that financial data would be available. I included only completed deals and only cases 
where acquiring firms acquired 100% of the target‘s stocks, and the target firm did not 
remain as an independent entity after the deals. These restrictions provided me with 8,239 
deals. Finally, I restricted the sample to US-based acquirers and target firms to insure 
data availability of SEC filings (especially 10-Ks and proxy statements) - the data sources 
for the explanatory variables, which I define shortly. 
Limiting the study to a single country has the advantage of eliminating variation 
in country-level factors that simultaneously influence M&A performance and explanatory 
variables in this study – especially the composition of top management teams and boards 
of directors. Out of 8,239 deals, 4,075 deals include non-US acquirer or target firms
8
. 
Most of those deals are made by firms in Europe or Canada (Europe - 1,521, Canada -
854). Despite some similarities to mature markets similar to the US, the market for 
corporate control in Europe has unique characteristics (Moschieri & Campa, 2009).  
With such differences, it is suggested not to assume that theoretical or empirical 
frameworks for M&As in the US automatically apply in Europe. Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) also reports distinct features of M&As in Europe compared to those in the US, 
insofar as European acquisitions are mainly domestic, friendly, and often arranged 
through a private transaction, contrasting with the prevalence of hostile deals through 
public tender offers in the US. In addition, data on the top managers of non-US firms are 
not readily available. Although some databases (e.g., ORBIS and MintGlobal) provide a 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Partial Interest), AR (Acquisition of Remaining Interest), AA (Acquisition of Assets), AC 
(Acquisition of Certain Assets), R (Recapitalization), B (Buyback), and EO (Exchange Offer).   
8
 If its ultimate parent firm is foreign, the firm is regarded as foreign. 
  50 
partial list of current executives in firms in foreign countries, they do not provide 
historical data, so it was impossible to collect data on a top management team and board 
of directors after the time of a deal completion.  
In addition, given that top management positions are not quite equivalent across 
countries (Mayer & Whittington, 1999), it is inevitable to limit the study to the US 
context. This screening procedure resulted in a base sample of 4,164 US M&A deals. 
From the SDC database, data on the deal characteristics, such as the announcement and 
completion date, form of the deal, form of payment, deal attitude, number of bidders and 
premium paid to a target, along with the data on firm characteristics, such as total assets, 
market value, primary SIC code
9
, and city and state where the headquarters of the 
acquirer and target are located, are gathered. 
Data to construct variables used in this study are obtained from the SDC, Standard 
and Poor‘s Compustat Annual Industry Files, Compustat/CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices) Merged, Compustat Segment Files, Eventus, and SEC filings (10-Ks and 
proxy statements).  
The effective sample consisted of 298 deals after the exclusion of 3,866 deals. Of 
the deals removed, either acquirers or targets‘ firm identifiers (CUSIP, GVKEY, 
PERMNO, etc.) were unavailable in any forms that were necessary upon which to draw 
data from the databases listed above. Also a deal was dropped from the sample if the 
acquirer did not acquire 100% of the stock or assets of the targets, or if it was a 
subsidiary acquisition so that the target firm remained after the acquisition. Because this 
                                                 
9
 Data on total assets, market value and primary SIC codes are cross-checked with those from the 
Compustat Annual Industry Files. 
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study draws on multiple databases, firms in the sample had many missing pieces of data. 
In addition, many firms terminated their existence in less than three years after the deal 
was made, and the deals including such firms were also dropped, as the measurement of a 
dependent variable in this study requires three-year observations of financial data after 
the deal is completed. Finally, the deals were dropped if acquirers made other 
acquisitions (including foreign acquisitions) one year before and three months after the 
focal acquisition. If the same acquirers were engaged in the deals of the sample more than 
once, such deals were also dropped. 
Table 2 shows information on the years of the announcement of deals in the 
sample. Tables 3a and 3b show the primary industries of the acquirers and targets at 
major group level and Table 3c and 3d show them at division level.  
**Insert Tables 2, 3a, 3b, 3c, & 3d Here** 
4.2 Criteria for Strong and Weak Performers: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q based 
on a “Chop-shop” Approach 
In a paper on the relationship between acquisition performance and the Tobin‘s q 
ratios of targets and bidders, Lang et al. (1989) used one as a cut-off point to separate 
high q firms from low q firms. In a successive research to that of Lang et al. (1989), 
Servaes (1991) used the industry-average as an alternative cut-off point to separate firms 
into high and low q‘s given that q is industry-specific. Following Servaes (1991), in this 
study, I used the industry-median q ratio as a cut-off point to classify firms as over- and 
underperformers. Because most firms in the sample are multi-business, I followed a 
―chop-shop‖ approach when calculating the industry-median q ratio. Below I explain 
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what Tobin‘s q is, the merits of the q ratio as a performance measure, and how I 
calculated the industry-median q ratio. 
Tobin‘s q is defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the 
same physical asset. The Q ratio has been considered to be significant and useful as the 
relationship between financial markets, and markets for goods and services (Tobin & 
Brainard, 1977); thus, the q ratio has been employed to explain diverse corporate 
phenomena (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). If the value of Tobin‘s q is one, then it can be 
inferred that the market value exactly reflects the recorded assets of the firm. If q is 
greater than one, this suggests that the market value reflects some unmeasured assets of 
the firm. Firms with a high q are encouraged to invest more in assets, because they are 
worth more than the price they paid for those assets. If q is less than one, this suggests 
that the market may undervalue the firm. I use this metric as a measure of a firm‘s 
performance. To calculate Tobin‘s q, I divide a firm‘s market value by a firm‘s book 
value of its total assets. A firm‘s market value is calculated as the sum of a firm‘s total 
assets and market value (=common shares outstanding*share price) minus common 
equity. This is a modified formula
10
 of Tobin‘s q, which is suggested in Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997).  The data used in this calculation are from Compustat and the 
Compustat/CRSP Merged database. 
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 The original formula for Tobin‘s q in Kaplan and Zinglaes (1997: 177) is the ―market value of 
assets/book value of assets (item 6) where the market value of assets equals the book value of 
assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity 
(item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74).‖ The modified formula used in this study 
does not include the item ―balance sheet deferred taxes‖ in the numerator, due to many missing 
values in this item in the Compustat Annual Industry Files and Compustat/CRSP Merged 
databases. Since the values of the balanced sheet deferred taxes were negligible in most cases, the 
q ratios calculated without this item did not materially affect the estimates of q. 
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To calculate the industry-median Tobin‘s q, I used the ―Chop-shop‖ method. This 
is a popular approach in ﬁnance (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Shin & 
Stulz, 1998; Villalonga, 2002), although it has been less widely used in the strategy 
literature. By using the ‗‗chop shop‘‘ method, one can estimate the industry-median value 
by chopping the diversified firms into their divisions and comparing the value of firms to 
the q ratios that these firms would have if the stand-alone q ratio of each division were 
the median q ratio of the single-segment firms in its industry. This is referred to as the 
hypothetical q ratio. This approach was pioneered by LeBaron and Speidell (1987), who 
coined the term for the ―chop-shop‖ approach. Researchers have used this method to 
calculate diversification discounts or premiums (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Villalonga, 2002). 
Given that some firms in the sample are multi-business firms, this approach can 
estimate the industry-median value of sample firms more accurately by considering all of 
the industries where firms‘ divisions operate instead of only one primary industry of 
firms. By Statement 14 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, companies have 
been required to disclose details of the operations of their business segments since 1976, 
and this information has been collected by Compustat. 
Compustat Segment Files was used to identify all of the business segments
11
 of 
each sample firm. The sales and total assets for each segment were drawn to be used as a 
multiplier. Also single-segment firms operating in each industry (identified at the 4-digit 
level of the first SIC code assigned to each segment) were defined as ―pure-play‖ firms in 
                                                 
11
 There are four types of segments in the Compustat Segment Files: Business, Operating, State 
and Geographic. In this study, only the Business Segment is considered, since the SIC code is 
assigned only for this type of segment.  
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that industry. This assignment follows the rationale of Villalonga (2002), who considers 
any firm in the Compustat company-level files that does not report more than one 
segment in the segment files as specialized. Segments with no SIC code or no sales data 
were dropped. The median of Tobin‘s q ratios was then calculated for each industry, 
using the pure-play firms. A weighted average of industry median values was calculated 
for each sample firm, using the segment sales for the weight, and this was the imputed q 
ratio of the firm. 
The longer the period of low performance that is required for a firm to be labeled 
as a poor performer, the more certain it is that the pattern is truly significant, and not just 
a temporary anomaly (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994). Using a very long period, 
however, can greatly reduce the usable sample size. Therefore, three consecutive years of 
average excess values (a firm‘s own q – Imputed q) prior to an M&A announcement was 
used to classify sample firms into over- and underperformers. A firm‘s excess value was 
defined as follows: 
Average excess value = 
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announcement, respectively). 
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If its three-year average of such an excess value is greater than zero, a firm is 
deemed as an overperformer (strong firm); otherwise, it is classified as an under-
performer (weak firm). 
Table 4 contains the summary statistics of the number of segments where 
acquirers and targets belong, and Tobin‘s q ratios of acquirers and targets for three years 
prior to the M&A announcement. Table 5 shows how sample deals are classified, based 
on the three-year average excess q ratio.  
**Insert Tables 4 & 5 Here** 
4.3 Dependent Variable 
M&A Performance. Value creation from combining firms is synonymous with 
synergy from an M&A. It is said that synergy exists if the value of the merged entity 
exceeds the sum of the values of the two merging firms (Seth, 1990). Therefore, the 
dependent variable M&A Performance is measured as the difference between pre-merger 
and post-merger performance. For the same reasons, I chose Tobin‘s q as the basis for the 
criteria used to classify firms into strong and weak categories, and in order to be 
consistent with such criteria, I used Tobin‘s q ratio as a measure of performance. Since 
information regarding who will fill up the TMT and BOD is not completely available at 
the time of merger announcement, cumulative abnormal return around a merger 
announcement is not considered as an appropriate dependent variable of this study. 
Following Ramaswamy (1997), pre-merger performance is calculated as the sales-
weighted mean of the q ratio of both an acquirer and a target firm over a three-year 
period prior to their merger announcement. As Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland 
noted, ―Combining statements in the pre-acquisition period overcomes the bias toward 
  56 
attributing merger related success or failure to performance differences that would have 
existed even if a merger had not occurred‖ (1991:181). Post-merger performance is 
calculated as the mean of the q ratio of the merged entity for the three years after the 
merger completion. 
4.4 Explanatory Variables 
In this study, the explanatory variables of interest include the proportion of 
outsiders in the resulting management team and the board of directors after a merger, the 
power balance between the two merging entities, and the resource relatedness between 
the two parties. I explain how I measure each variable in more detail below. 
4.4.1 Influx of outsiders 
Outsiders’ Ratio Measure. The primary independent variables of interest capture 
the proportions of outsiders relative to the total executive officers in a top management 
team and the total number of directors on the board of directors of a combined entity. An 
executive is considered as an outsider executive if the executive joined the merged firm 
after the merger
12
 and was not an employee of the pre-merged entities in which he or she 
took office at the time of the merger (Shen & Cannella, 2002). An outsider director is 
defined similarly as the newly appointed director to the board of the merged entity after 
completion of the merger, and the director who was not on the boards of the pre-merged 
entities before the merger. 
                                                 
12
 Given that there is often an influx of outsiders around a merger announcement and completion, 
the additional measurement of an outsider—an executive or a director who has been with the firm 
for one year or less when the merger is made— is used for a sensitivity test. The result was 
similar, but weaker. 
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The variable Outsiders in TMT captures the ratio of the number of executive 
positions taken by outsiders to the total number of executive positions in the top 
management team of a newly combined firm. To capture the executive officers 
composing a top management team of the merged firm and pre-merged entities, I draw on 
their 10-K, an annual report required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which provides a comprehensive summary of a public company‘s management 
and performance. In a 10-K, companies are required to report information on the 
company‘s history, executive officers, executive compensation, equity, subsidiaries, and 
audited financial statements. Item 4 of Part I or Item 10 of Part III of the registrant‘s 
annual report on the 10-K includes a separate item captioned, ―Executive Officers of the 
Registrant.‖  
Here, for the purpose of identifying executive officers, companies are required to 
―list the names and ages of all executive officers of the registrant and all persons chosen 
to become executive officers, indicate all positions and offices with the registrant held by 
each such person, state his term of office as officer and the period during which he has 
served as such‖ and ―briefly describe the business experience during the past five years of 
each executive officer.‖13 It is noteworthy that the firm can exercise discretion in 
decisions regarding how many people and whom to report as executive officers. I 
consider the list of the executive officers in the Form 10-K as reflecting the top 
management team of the firm. The information on ―Executive Officers of the Registrant‖ 
                                                 
13
 Source: Standard instructions for filing forms under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975-Regulation S-K Subpart 
229.400-Management and Certain Securities Holders. 
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in the Form 10-K has been used to define the top management team in previous studies 
(e.g., Gordon, Stewart, Sweo, & Luker, 2000).  
I refer to the first 10-K after the closing of the merger. Based on the career history 
of each executive, I identify whether an executive is from the acquiring firm, the target 
firm, or from outside the merging firms. I exclude the members of the board of directors, 
including the chairman when counting the TMT, unless they are also executive officers, 
in order to avoid double counting those members, both in the TMT and BOD. 
The variable Outsiders in BOD is measured as the percentage of the number of 
outsider directors on the board of directors. Directors of the merged firm and pre-merged 
entities are captured from their DEF 14A, an annual definitive proxy statement. It 
includes a separate item captioned, ―Election of Directors.‖ Here, for the purpose of 
identifying directors, firms are required to ―list the names and ages of all directors of the 
registrant and all persons nominated or chosen to become directors, indicate all positions 
and offices with the registrant held by each such person, state his term of office as 
director and any period(s) during which he has served as such, describe briefly any 
arrangement or understanding between him and any other person(s) (naming such 
person(s)) pursuant to which he was or is to be selected as a director or nominee.‖14   
4.4.2 Power balance 
I measure the degree of the power balance between merging firms in three ways: 
equal representation in the top management team and the board of directors of a 
combined firm and the similarity in the size of pre-merged firms. Information on how 
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 Source: Standard instructions for filing forms under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975-Regulation S-K Subpart 
229.400-Management and Certain Securities Holders. 
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positions in the TMT and BOD are shared between the acquirer and target firms is drawn 
from a firm‘s first 10-K and DEF 14A after the closing of the merger. 
The variable Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT captures the degree of 
deviation from the perfect balance of power in a combined entity‘s TMT between two 
merging entities. It is measured as the absolute value of the difference between 0.5 and 
the proportion of the positions filled by the executives from the target firm relative to the 
executive positions taken by members from the target and acquiring firms. More 
specifically, I define this variable as |0.5-(the number of executive positions taken by 
members from a target firm/sum of the number of executive positions taken by members 
from the target and acquiring firms)|. Here, 0.5 stands for the ratio in which the case of 
equal representation can take.  
Similarly, the variable Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD captures the 
degree of deviation from the perfect balance of power in a combined entity‘s BOD 
between two merging entities. It is measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between 0.5 and the proportion of the positions on the board filled by people from the 
target firm relative to the board positions taken by people from the target and acquiring 
firms. Namely, I define this variable as |0.5-(the number of director positions taken by 
members from a target firm/sum of the number of director positions taken by members 
from the target and acquiring firms)|. Sometimes a person who was an executive officer 
in an acquirer or target firm becomes a director in a combined firm, and such a case is 
also counted.  
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A third measure of the power balance between two merging firms is size 
similarity. As measurements of firm size, sales (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996; Waddock, 
1997), total assets (e.g., Asquith et al. 1983; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002) and the 
number of employees (e.g., Bastien & Van de Ven, 1986) have been widely used. In this 
study, I use sales as a proxy for firm size
15
. This criterion helps internal consistency, as I 
used sales as a multiplier for segments in the chop-shop approach for the classification of 
firms into over- and underperformers and weight for calculating the weighted-means of 
pre-merger performance. I create the variable Deviation From Equal Size, which is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between 0.5 and the proportion of a 
target‘s sales relative to the sum of a target‘s and an acquirer‘s sales prior to the merger. 
More specifically, this variable is calculated as |0.5-(the sales of a target firm/sum of the 
sales of a target and an acquiring firm)|. The sales of an acquiring firm and a target firm 
were gathered from the Compustat Annual Industry Files. I used sales as of the date of 
the most current figures prior to the date of the merger announcement. 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of the size of the TMT and BOD and the 
origins of executives and directors of a merged firm. Figure 2a-2d presents histograms of 
the numbers of executives and directors from a target firm and from outside.   
**Insert Table 6 and Figure 2a-2d Here** 
4.4.3 Relatedness 
I employ two measures of resource relatedness in this study: industry overlap and 
geographical overlap. 
                                                 
15
 Alternative firm size measures – total assets, market values, and the number of employees—
were tested and the results did not change. 
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Existing measures of industry overlap typically rely on the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) system. To capture relatedness, researchers classify two businesses 
as unrelated if they do not share the same two-, three-, or four-digit SIC code, and vice-
versa. This method has been directly applied to mergers and diversification studies, such 
as Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Berger and Ofek (1995), among others. 
Although there is some criticism on using the SIC-based measure of relatedness (first, 
they do not reveal relatedness types; second, they are discrete, and hence, do not measure 
the degree of relatedness; third, they are subject to classification errors), the method has 
been widely used to measure resource relatedness.  Following Capron (1999), I regard 
two firms as related if such firms operate within the same industry, defined at the four-
digit SIC code level. The variable Industry Overlap is coded as 1 if two firms operate 
within the same industry and zero, otherwise.  
In addition to industry overlap, I use geographical overlap as a second measure of 
relatedness. The degree of geographic overlap has been used as an approximation of 
resource relatedness (Healy et al., 1992). Zollo (1997) uses geographical overlap of the 
branch networks of banks as a proxy for the degree of resource relatedness between 
merging banks. Following this insight, I create a dummy variable labeled as Geography 
Overlap, which has a value of one if the two firms‘ headquarters are located in the same 
city and zero, otherwise. Geographical overlap measured at the city level is more precise 
than one at the state level. 
4.5 Control variables  
 Based on previous works of M&A performance, a set of deal characteristics is 
controlled. 
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The method of payment (i.e., cash or stock) used for the acquisition (Franks, 
Harris, & Mayer, 1988; Travlos, 1987; Walker, 2000) has been known to affect M&A 
performance. Moreover, controlling the method of payment is desirable in this study for 
an additional reason. If the firms classified as poor performers in this study are actually 
undervalued firms, routine disruption may not be a desirable turnaround strategy. 
Therefore, I need to rule out the possibility of misvaluation. There are indicators of 
misvaluation, such as the method of payment (stock versus cash) and the bid premium 
(Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006). More highly valued bidders are more 
likely to use stock and are less likely to use cash as consideration. Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) find that cash targets are undervalued relative to 
stock targets.  
Moreover, cash acquirers are less overvalued than stock acquirers. Also, more 
highly valued bidders are willing to pay more relative to the target market price, and low 
valuation targets receive higher premia relative to the market price (Dong et al., 2006). 
Fishman (1989) finds that cash offers in M&A transactions deliver positive information 
about the valuation of the acquirer‘s assets. I control for the method of payment (cash, 
stock, or mixed payment) by creating two dummy variables, Pay in Stock and Pay in 
Cash. If payment was made in 100% stock, then the variable Pay in Stock takes a value 
of one and zero, otherwise. If payment was made in 100% cash, then the variable Pay in 
Cash is coded as one and zero, otherwise. Information on the method of payment comes 
from the item ―Percentage of consideration paid in cash‖ and ―Percentage of 
consideration paid in stock‖ in the SDC Platinum‘s M&A database.  
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For the variable Premium, I referred to the item, ―Premium 4 Weeks Prior to 
Announcement Date,‖ which is defined as the ―premium of offer price to target closing 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date‖ in the SDC Platinum‘s 
M&A database. This is calculated as 100*[(Price paid per common share by the acquirer 
in the transaction - Target stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date)/Target 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date]. The four-week time lag has been 
used to obtain the value, which is not confounded by the takeover announcement and 
leakage of information right before the announcement (e.g., Nathan & O‘Keefe, 1989). 
This way of measuring the acquisition premium has been widely used in prior acquisition 
research (e.g., Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Kisgen, Qian, & Song, 2009).  
The variable Contested Bid captures whether there exists more than one bidder. If 
there are a number of bidders, it can negatively impact the acquirer‘s gains (Datta, 
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Competing bidders may 
drive up the premium paid to a target firm, so acquisitions with contested bidding usually 
result in lower gains for the acquirer than those with only one bidder (Barney, 1988; 
Varaiya & Ferris, 1987). Using the variable in line with Hayward (2002) and Capron and 
Shen (2007), I define a contested deal with a dummy variable Contested Bid as 1 if the 
number of bidders is greater than one as reported in the SDC and zero, otherwise.  
For the variable Attitude, I referred to the SDC Platinum‘s M&A database, which 
classifies acquisitions as either friendly or hostile, based on primary reference sources 
such as the Wall Street Journal and other various trade publications. The variable Attitude 
has a value of one if the acquisition was hostile and zero, otherwise.  
  64 
Year dummies are also included.  I created dummy variables to capture three time 
periods in the sample: Year1994-1998 and Year1999-2002. The characteristics of the 
sixth merger wave that started in 2003 and came to an end in mid-2007 are distinguished 
from those of the fifth merger wave between 1992 and 2002. In this new wave of 
mergers, the driver was primarily the availability of abundant liquidity. Also, the market 
for corporate control is less competitive, so significantly lower premiums were paid to 
target firms, indicating more cautious and rational M&A decisions (Alexandridis, 
Mavrovitis, & Travlos, 2010). Mergers and acquisitions made in the turn-of-the-century 
dot-com boom from the end of the 1990s and into the early 2000s are also distinguished 
from deals in other periods. The dot.com bubble led investors to overvalue many firms, 
so it was implausible for acquirers that purchased such firms to recoup the purchase price 
(e.g., merger between AOL and Time Warner) (Marks & Mirvis, 2010). Thus, I created a 
dummy Year1999-2002, which has a value of one if deals were made between 1999 and 
2002. 
 
Another set of controls related to the characteristics of acquirers and targets are 
also included. Acquiring firms with higher levels of acquisition experience and with more 
sophisticated acquisition tools tend to integrate the acquired organization to a greater 
extent and are more likely to replace the top management (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Also, it 
is shown that acquisition experience has an effect on acquisition behavior (Haleblian, 
Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). For these reasons, acquisition experience has been used to 
explain M&A performance and integration (Franks, Harris, & Titman, 1991; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002). Since both an acquirer and a target work together to 
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create value from a merger, I consider the acquisition experience of a target firm, as well. 
I pay equal attention to the prior acquisition experience of both an acquirer and a target. 
The variable Acquisition Experience is measured as the sum of the number of 
acquisitions made by an acquirer and a target for the three years prior to the 
announcement date of a focal acquisition. I only counted the acquisitions of public firms 
in the US in order to be consistent with the characteristics of the sample firms.  
 The ages of the merging firms are also controlled since they are considered to 
affect the level of the outsider‘s ratio in TMTs or BODs and/or firm performance. Prior 
studies show that the firm age predicts a CEO‘s origin – insider vs. outsider status – and 
indicates his/her tendency to initiate change (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Datta & Guthrie, 
1994; Guthrie & Datta, 1997; Schwartz & Menon, 1985). In addition, young firms 
usually have a higher failure rate than older firms, due to liabilities of newness. Older 
firms are usually more experienced, have greater reliability and legitimacy, benefit from 
learning, and are associated with the first mover advantage (McDougall & Oviatt, 1996). 
 Lastly, firm age may influence the firms‘ level of resource stocks and growth 
potential (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003). For these 
reasons, firm age is included as a control and is measured as the natural log of the number 
of years since a firm‘s founding. The variable log(Firm Age) captures the ages of an 
acquiring and a target firm at the time of merger completion. Namely, it is defined as the 
log [(Year of merger completion – Acquirer‘s founding year) + (Year of merger 
completion – Target‘s founding year)]. Since the age of firms in the sample vary from 1 
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to 194, I normalized it by taking the natural log. Information on firms‘ founding years is 
collected from Mergent
16
 and a Google online search. 
4.6 Estimation Method  
The unit of analysis in this study is an M&A transaction. The dependent variable 
to be estimated is M&A performance measured as the difference between post-merger 
and pre-merger performance. Predictors of interest are outsiders‘ ratios in a top 
management team and board of directors, the power balance between merging firms, and 
resource relatedness. To test the hypotheses, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis, given the continuous nature of the dependent variable. Since the 
sample is ―clean,‖ in the sense that acquirers who engaged in more than one acquisition 
in the sample period were dropped from the sample, clustering the standard errors by an 
acquirer was unnecessary. Using the following base regression model, hypotheses were 
tested on the WW sample (a group of mergers between low performers) and the non-WW 
sample (a group of mergers, including at least one high performer) separately to compare 
the coefficient estimates of the variables.  
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For convenience, I will refer to the group of mergers between underperformers as 
the WW group, and those with at least one overperformer as the non-WW group. 
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Additionally, I conduct a Chow test (Chow, 1960) to determine whether the differences 
between the subsample model (a group of WW mergers and a group of non-WW 
mergers) coefficients are statistically significant. 
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Chapter 5. RESULTS 
 
 
Tables 7a, 8a, and 9a provide the descriptive statistics of the variables for the 
entire sample, the WW sample and the non-WW sample, respectively. Tables 7b, 8b, and 
9b present the correlations among the variables in the entire, WW, and non-WW samples.  
** Insert Tables 7a-b, 8a-b & 9a-b Here ** 
I conduct t-tests to compare the mean scores of variables in the model for WW 
and non-WW mergers. Table 10 presents the results of the t-tests. On average, the 
performance of a merged firm improves more when a merger was made between poor 
performers compared to a merger including at least one high performer. This is a bit 
surprising, but it is confirmed again with an alternative measure of M&A performance in 
sensitivity analyses later in this chapter. In WW mergers, more dominance by one party 
over the other party on the board of directors tends to be observed, compared to non-WW 
mergers. WW mergers are more likely made with cash, compared to non-WW mergers. 
Finally, a significantly higher ratio of non-WW mergers was completed during the 
dot.com boom period.  
** Insert Table 10 Here ** 
To check for multi-collinearity problems among the variables, I computed 
variance inflation factors (VIFs), but did not find any troubling cases.  Across the models, 
the VIFs ranged from 1.06 to 1.53, and the average VIF was not significantly greater than 
1 (Chatterjee, Hadi, & Price, 2000). Thus, I included all variables in the regressions.  
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The model is  first estimated  by  pooling  all data from  all  types of combinations  
and  is  then  estimated on  a  subsample basis (WW vs. non-WW). The results from the 
Chow test, presented later, indicate that the subsamples exhibit different effects for the 
explanatory variables in this study. 
By running the regression models with a full sample, I check if the sample used in 
this study is in line with those used in previous studies on M&A performance. Table 11a 
shows the results of multiple regression analyses of M&A performance with the entire 
sample. Model 1 includes only the control variables,
17
 which generally exhibit the 
expected signs and significance. Consistent with prior literature, payment in stock has a 
negative effect on M&A performance. Also, the older an acquirer and a target are, the 
greater improvement in performance after an M&A they exhibit. Overall, deals made 
during the dot-com boom perform worse than those made during other periods of time in 
the sample.  
** Insert Tables 11a Here ** 
In Table 11b, I split the sample by types of combinations (WW and non-WW). 
Models 1-4 show the results for a group of WW mergers, and Models 5-8 present the 
results for a group of non-WW mergers, to test the predictions of Hypothesis 1a through 
Hypothesis 3b. I include only the control variables in Models 1 and 5, and all of the 
variables in the fully specified Models 4 and 8. I dropped variables related to TMT and 
BOD in Models 2-3 and Models 6-7, respectively, to address possible collinearity 
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 Although Deviation From Equal Size is an independent variable in this study, the way it is 
constructed is a mirror of the relative size of two firms (=sales of target/sum of target‘s sales and 
acquirer‘s sales), which is a conventional control variable in M&A performance research. Thus, I 
include Deviation From Equal Size in all Models 1-4. 
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between compositions of TMT and BOD. Hypothesis 1a predicted that a higher ratio of 
outsiders in the top management team of a combined entity would result in better 
performance after an M&A in mergers between poor performers. In support of 
Hypothesis 1a, the outsider ratio in the TMT has a positive effect on M&A performance 
when it is included without BOD-related variables in Model 2 (p =0.002), as well as in 
the full Model 4 (p =0.076).  
Since I am using a linear regression model, the coefficients are the same as the 
marginal effects and can be directly interpreted to assess the effect of a 1-unit change in 
each independent variable on the magnitude of change in a dependent variable. The 
magnitude of the coefficient estimate indicates that M&A performance (Tobin‘s q) 
increases by about 0.01 when the new management teams have a 1% greater composition 
from the outside. Similarly, the outsider ratio in the BOD has a stronger positive effect on 
M&A performance in Model 3 (p=0.004), as well as in Model 4(p=0.038), thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1b, which predicts that the ratio of outsiders on a board of 
directors in a merged entity will have a positive effect on M&A performance. The value 
of the coefficient estimate demonstrates that having a 1% greater composition from the 
outside (neither from an acquirer‘s nor a target‘s board) on a new board of directors will 
result in an approximately a 0.015 increase in the three-year average Tobin‘s q after an 
M&A. The joint inclusion of the four variables related to TMT and BOD in Model 4 
significantly increased the value of the F-statistics relative to Model 1 (controls only) and 
Models 2-3 (TMT- and BOD-related variables, separately).  
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Although I did not make a formal prediction for the non-WW group, I expected to 
see differences in the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates or the significance of the 
variables in this group, compared to those in the WW group. Models 5-8 in Table 10b 
show the results for the group of non-WW mergers. The outsider ratio in the TMT has a 
negative effect on M&A performance when it is included without BOD-related variables 
in Model 6 (p =0.002), as well as when it is included with all other variables in Model 8 
(p =0.009). This finding suggests that a higher ratio of outsiders in a new top 
management team harms the performance of a merged firm. Similarly, the outsider ratio 
on a BOD negatively affects M&A performance, both in Models 7 (p=0.090) and 8 
(p=0.062), indicating that firm performance decreases if a new board of directors has a 
higher ratio of directors from the outside. The magnitude of the negative effect, which 
occurs with a greater BOD composition from the outside in the non-WW group, is much 
larger than that of a positive effect in the WW group. The value of the coefficient 
estimate reveals that having a 1% greater composition from the outside in a new top 
management team and a new board of directors will result in a decrease in the three-year 
average Tobin‘s q after an M&A of about 0.031 and 0.024, respectively.  
In Hypothesis 2, I argued that a merged firm with balanced power between 
merging firms would improve their performance more than a merged firm with 
imbalanced power. At the operational level, Hypothesis 2a predicts that the more equal 
representation the new management team has, the higher the post-merger performance a 
merged firm will achieve. Because of the way the variable Deviation From Equal 
Representation in TMT is constructed, the negative sign of a coefficient estimate means a 
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positive correlation of the variable with M&A performance. The coefficients on 
Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT are not significant in both Models 2 and 4, 
thereby failing to support Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b predicts that equal representation 
from two merging firms on a new board of directors after M&A will have a positive 
effect on the performance of a merged firm. Although the signs of the coefficient 
estimates for the variable Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD are in the 
expected direction (negative) in both Models 3 and 4, the coefficients are not significant. 
The third measure of power balance was based on the sizes of the merging firms – total 
sales as of the date of the most current figures prior to the date of the merger 
announcement. The effect of the variable Deviation From Equal Size is not significant in 
all Models 1-4, thereby failing to support Hypothesis 2c. Hence, all of Hypotheses 2 
regarding power balance receive no support in the data. 
In the non-WW sample, the effects of the power balance showed mixed results. 
The effect of Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT is positive and significant on 
M&A performance (Model 8). This finding indicates that a merged firm performs better 
when one firm is more dominant over the other firm in non-WW mergers. Deviation 
From Equal Representation in BOD, however, negatively affects the performance of a 
combined firm, as shown in Models 7 and 8. This result suggests that in non-WW 
mergers, rather than in WW mergers, the more balanced power distribution between 
merging firms on a BOD leads to better performance of a combined firm after an M&A, 
contrary to my prediction. 
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Next, I examine the effect of relatedness between merging firms‘ resources. In 
Hypothesis 3a, I predict that better performance after an M&A can be achieved when two 
merging firms are from different industries if they are both poor performers in their 
industry. Also, I argued in Hypothesis 3b that if two firms were located in different cities 
prior to combining, their performance would improve more due to less overlap in their 
resources. Both the effects of industry and geography overlap are not significant, thereby 
failing to support Hypotheses 3a and 3b. In non-WW mergers, coefficients of the 
variables related to resource relatedness are not significant. Taken together, the results 
with respect to resource relatedness do not support Hypothesis 3.  
** Insert Tables 11b Here ** 
I conducted the Chow test (Chow, 1960) to confirm that the differences in the 
coefficient estimates between the subsample models (a group of WW mergers and a 
group of non-WW mergers) were statistically significant. The Chow test is a test of 
equality between coefficients in two identical linear regression models, based on two 
different sets of data. Namely, the Chow test examines if the parameters (slopes and the 
intercept) of one group are different from those of the other group.  The null hypothesis 
for each Chow test predicts that two groups of mergers have equal parameters for each 
variable, and the levels of significance found for the variables are not statistically 
different between the two types of mergers.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the two groups do not share the 
same intercept or slopes of the variables. The results of a Chow test indicated that the 
WW and non-WW groups do not have equal parameters for each variable, and the levels 
of significance found for the variables are statistically different between them 
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(F17,264=2.73, p=0.0003). For the additional test, I created an interaction term of the 
regressors with the dummy variable WW, and I then fit the model with this interaction. In 
Table 12, the M&A performance regression coefficients for the WW mergers are 
compared to those of the non-WW mergers (they are the same as the coefficient estimates 
on Models 4 and 8 in Table 11b). The third column of the table presents the results of 
each Chow test. Given the results of the Chow tests, the coefficients of the three 
independent variables – Outsiders in TMT, Outsiders in BOD, and Deviation From Equal 
Representation in TMT – are statistically different between the WW and non-WW 
groups. 
 A comparison of the regression coefficients of the outsider‘s ratio in the TMT 
and BOD between the two groups indicates that the difference between the two is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. More specifically, the higher ratio of outsiders in 
the TMT or BOD is beneficial for M&A performance in WW, but it is much more 
detrimental in non-WW groups. In addition, the effect of the power imbalance between 
merging firms in the TMT of a merged entity on firm performance is much greater and 
significant in the non-WW group than in the WW group. This shows that a power 
imbalance has a positive relationship with performance in the non-WW group, while it 
has a negative relationship in the WW group. It is interesting to note that the magnitudes 
of the coefficient estimates are much greater in the non-WW group than in the WW 
group, indicating greater effects of the variables of interest in non-WW mergers. The 
other two measures of the power balance (Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD 
and Deviation From Equal Size) seem to make no difference across the two groups.  
** Insert Table 12 Here ** 
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The results of Chow tests for the control variables merit additional attention. 
These control variables are the most frequently used ones in M&A performance research. 
It is known that stock payment in purchasing a firm has a negative effect on M&A 
performance due to overvaluation (Dong et al., 2006). This holds, however, only in the 
non-WW group, with the effect being much greater and significant. The effect of firm age 
is also different across the two samples at the 0.05 significance level. When merging 
firms are older at the time of merging, the performance of a combined entity is worse in 
WW mergers, but this is not the case in the non-WW group.  
Summary of Key Results 
 
 Table 13 provides a summary of the hypotheses and the corresponding findings. 
The results indicate strong support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. I found no support for 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, and 3b. Below I briefly review these findings. 
** Insert Table 13 Here ** 
 Hypotheses 1a and 1b, which argued that a higher ratio of outsiders in the TMT 
and BOD of a newly combined firm leads to better performance through an M&A, 
respectively, received strong support. In mergers between underperformers, having more 
outsiders in the corporate governance system (i.e., TMT or BOD) clearly improved firm 
performance after an M&A. Contrary to this result, an influx of outsiders harms firm 
performance to a much greater degree if at least one of the merging firms is a strong firm. 
This difference is confirmed as significant with the Chow tests. I expected that a degree 
of power balance between merging firms would be positively associated with 
performance improvement through an M&A in Hypotheses 2a through 2c.  
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Although none of the measures of power balance had significant effects in the 
WW sample, a degree of power balance among the TMT was found to be negatively 
related to performance in the non-WW sample. In addition, the effect of this variable was 
different across subsamples (WW and non-WW) at a significant level (p<0.05). Contrary 
to my prediction, the effects of resource relatedness as measured by industry overlap 
(four-digit SIC code) and geography overlap (headquarters‘ location at the city level) 
were not significant in either group.    
Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Two dimensions that appear important for robustness purposes are an alternative 
comparison group and alternative measures of M&A performance. 
WW vs. SS. In this section, I compare the coefficient estimates of the variables 
between a group of WW mergers and a group of SS mergers. Non-WW mergers include 
three types of combinations: strong acquirer – strong target, strong acquirer – weak 
target, and weak acquirer – strong target. Among these, the combinations of strong-strong 
firms (SS) are the antipode of WW mergers. Therefore, a comparison of these two groups 
can give clearer insights about how WW cases behave differently. Table 14 presents the 
OLS regression results of a group of SS mergers (n=82). Model 4 shows the results from 
the full model specification.  
Overall, the results are the same as those from the non-WW mergers, except that 
the effects of the variables are much greater in this group than in the non-WW group. For 
example, the outsider ratio in the TMT has a greater negative effect on the performance 
of a merged firm in SS, compared to non-WW mergers – a 0.054 decrease in q 
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performance with a 1% increase of the outsider‘s ratio in the TMT (vs. a 0.031 decrease 
in the non-WW group). Unlike in non-WW mergers, the effect of the variable Outsiders 
in BOD is not significant in SS mergers.  The effects of the power balance are also 
greater in this group than those in the non-WW group, but in the same direction. The 
effect of Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT is positive and significant on 
M&A performance, but Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD negatively affects 
the performance of a combined firm.  
The differences in the effects between the two groups (WW and SS) are greater 
than those between the WW and non-WW groups. The results from the Chow tests 
(Table 15) confirm this. Given the results of the Chow tests, the coefficients of three 
independent variables – Outsiders in TMT, Outsiders in BOD, and Deviation From Equal 
Representation in TMT – are statistically different between the WW and SS groups. A 
comparison of the regression coefficients of the outsider‘s ratio in TMT and BOD 
between the groups indicates that the difference between the two is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. Also, the effect of the power imbalance between merging 
firms in the TMT of a combined entity on performance is much greater in the SS group 
than the WW group (and in the non-WW group). As in the comparison with the non-WW 
group, the other two measures of the power balance (Deviation From Equal 
Representation in BOD and Deviation From Equal Size) seem to make no difference 
between groups of WW and SS. Overall, the contrast between WW and non-WW 
remains unchanged in the comparison between WW and SS. Rather, the differences are 
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more amplified in the comparison between a group of WW mergers and a group of SS 
mergers. 
** Insert Tables 14 and 15 Here ** 
Alternative performance measure. A review of empirical studies on M&As 
indicates that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been a frequently used approach 
for measuring M&A performance (e.g., Capron & Pistre, 2002; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 
2002; Rhoades, 1994). There is some evidence that this ex-ante measure also predicts the 
ultimate performance of an acquisition (e.g., Healey et al., 1992). This approach has been 
extensively described elsewhere (e.g., Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969; Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997).  
To calculate CARs, event study methodology is used (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
The event study method is based on the assumption that capital markets are efficient 
enough to estimate the effect of new information on the expected future profits of firms. 
The core assumption of event study methodology is that if information delivered to the 
market includes any surprising content, an abnormal return – the difference between the 
actual post-event return and the return expected in the absence of the event – will occur 
(MacKinlay, 1997). A positive abnormal return indicates that the stock market has 
revised its expectations upward of future returns from the stock; on the other hand, a 
negative return indicates that the market has lowered its expectations about the firm. The 
empirical literature is supportive of the idea that the market reaction at the time of a 
merger announcement is a reasonable indicator of longer-term realized firm performance. 
For example, Sirower (1997) found that acquirers‘ short-term returns at the time of an 
acquisition announcement were predictive of their long-term performance. Similar 
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findings were reported by Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992), suggesting that markets provide reasonable forecasts of subsequent acquisition 
performance.  
Although this measure was not used in the main analyses
18
, it is worth discussing 
the results from regressions on cumulative abnormal returns as M&A performance. I use 
the standard event study methodology with the following market model to calculate the 
CAR (Brown & Warner, 1985; Fama & French, 1992) for the combined entity: 
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where ti
AR , is the abnormal return for stock i at time t , ti
R , is the actual return on 
stock i at time t , and 
)( ,TIRE is the calculated expected return for stock i at time t . The 
expected return is dependent on i

for the systematic risk that correlates linearly to the 
average daily return m
R
of the market portfolio in the event window. For a group weight, 
I used the size of a firm‘s sales as of the date of the most current figure prior to the date 
of the merger announcement. 
Following this approach, I calculate a market model to estimate the expected 
performance of the ﬁrm‘s stock price around the time of the acquisition announcement. 
The market model adopted here estimates the relationship between ﬁrm returns and 
equally weighted market returns for the 301 trading days (roughly 1 year of trading), 
                                                 
18
 Since the information on the composition of TMT/BOD is not completely revealed at a merger 
announcement in many cases (an exception is a CEO or chairman‘s appointment, which is usually 
announced together with a merger plan), a market reaction to the merger announcement cannot 
capture the effect of management and board change properly.  
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ending 46 days prior to the announcement of the merger. This 46-day interval seeks to 
remove the effect of take-over news that could already be incorporated in the market 
price of the acquiring ﬁrm. In this study, Eventus19 was used to test the market reaction to 
the announcement of M&As.  
Although most research examines only short event windows, this approach can 
cause some potential problems in that it implicitly ignores returns following the 
announcement (Agrawal & Jaffe, 1992).  In addition, it may be reasonable sometimes to 
assume that information is revealed to investors slowly over a period of time (Rieck & 
Doan, 2007). Therefore, I decided to apply longer event window sizes.  
Therefore, this study examines two event windows, including both short and long 
windows: 5 days [2 days prior to the announcement day and 2 days after the 
announcement day] and 256 days [-3, +252]. Using both long-term and short-term 
measures of returns as dependent variables enhances the robustness of the findings. 
Tables 16a and17a present the descriptive statistics for the two types of CARs by 
a subsample (WW and non-WW mergers). Tables 16b and 17b show the correlations of 
CARs with other variables. In general, WW mergers seem to earn higher returns from 
both short and long windows, compared to the returns that non-WW mergers obtain from 
M&As, which corresponds to the market‘s immediate assessment of the acquisition and 
more delayed responses, presumably incorporating post-acquisition developments, 
                                                 
19
 Eventus
TM 
is software that is designed for the specific purpose of event studies. Eventus
TM
 is 
widely used in financial and economics research. It was developed by the US-based company 
Cowan Research LC – URL:http://www.eventstudy.com. CRSP is the source of the ﬁrm and 
market returns data. 
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respectively. This result suggests that the market‘s expectations are higher for 
combinations of poor performers relative to those for non-WW mergers.  
** Insert Tables 16a, 16b, 17a, and 17b Here ** 
Tables 18 and 19 present the results of the models with CARs as alternative 
measures of M&A performance. First, Table 18 re-estimates the models in Table 11b to 
include 256-day CARs as an alternative measure of the dependent variable. In general, 
the results for the hypothesized variables are consistent with those in Table 11b, but show 
weaker support. The effect of the outsiders‘ ratio in the TMT is not significant in WW 
mergers, while it is negative and significant in non-WW mergers, as was the case in 
Table 11b.  
The effect of the outsiders‘ ratio in the BOD remains positive and significant in 
WW mergers, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Unlike the findings shown in Table 11b, the 
effect of deviation from the power balance, measured as the size of a firm‘s sales is 
negative and significant, thus supporting Hypothesis 2c. The effect of cash payment 
becomes positive and significant in WW mergers with 256-day CARs as a dependent 
variable, while the significance of the log of firm age disappears. The contrast between 
WW and non-WW mergers remains, but with weaker significance.  
** Insert Tables 18 and 19 Here ** 
Second, Table 19 re-estimates the models in Table 11b with 5-day CARs as an 
alternative measure of the dependent variable. In general, the results for the hypothesized 
variables are consistent with those in Table 18, except for the effect of the power 
imbalance in BOD and premiums paid to targets. The effect of the variable Deviation 
From Equal Size is negative and significant, thereby supporting Hypothesis 3c, but it 
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remains similar in non-WW mergers, contrary to my prediction.  It is interesting to see 
that the effect of premiums is significantly positive in WW mergers, which is inconsistent 
with the conventional wisdom shown in the results from the full sample (Table 11a). 
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Chapter 6. DISCUSSION 
 
In this dissertation, I addressed the question, ―Under what conditions can mergers 
of poor performers create value?‖ and examined the role of routine disruption as a 
necessary condition for performance improvement in mergers of poor performers. 
Although mergers between poor performers seem to be prevalent, no systematic 
empirical evidence exists on whether and when such mergers are successful. Since WW 
mergers are unique in nature, the conditions under which mergers can create value cannot 
be the same as those that have been shown to affect performance in M&As generally. 
This study intends to fill this gap by suggesting an alternative conceptualization of a 
merger, identifying a set of conditions predicting success in the mergers of poor 
performers, and empirically testing those predictions. 
The theoretical framework I developed suggests that mergers can disrupt existing 
routines and serve as an impetus for change by creating more diverse variation in routines 
and by shifting the selection criteria of those routines. Although mergers by nature 
disturb the existing systems of the parties involved to some degree, the desirable type of 
disruption in mergers of two poor performers is obtained only when certain conditions 
are met. I argue that such a disruption can be achieved by stirring up the sources of path-
dependence in a firm: the composition of the top management team, the board of 
directors, and the firms‘ resources. More specifically, I argue that mergers of poor 
performers can create value if the top management team or board of directors is 
composed in a certain way after the merger is completed, and if the resources that the two 
merging firms bring together into a combined entity are less related to each other. I 
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suggest the influx of outsiders, the power balance between merging firms, and resource 
unrelatedness as three indicators of routine disruption through M&As and hypothesize 
the effect of each indicator on the performance of a combined firm after an M&A. The 
results largely supported this line of thought.  
Below I discuss the empirical findings in more detail. Then I discuss the 
contributions that this study hopes to make to the theoretical literature and to practice. 
Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the limitations of the study and suggestions for 
future research. 
Discussion of Research Findings 
 
The general hypothesis of this dissertation is that more routine disruption through 
M&As leads to better performance in a group of WW mergers. I suggested three 
indicators of routine disruption through M&A: the influx of outsiders, the power balance 
between merging firms, and resource unrelatedness. I hypothesized the effect of each 
indicator on the performance of a combined firm after an M&A. The first indicator of 
routine disruption through an M&A is the ratio of outsiders in the top management team 
or the board of directors of a newly merged firm.  
The empirical findings support my theoretical perspective on the relationship 
between the performance of a newly merged firm and the influx of outsiders into its top 
management team or board of directors in mergers of two poor performers. The higher 
ratio of outsiders composing the TMT or BOD after an M&A is associated with better 
performance outcomes in WW mergers. This finding suggests that executive officers or 
directors who are from an organization other than the merging firms indeed facilitate 
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more routine disruption inside a merged entity, leading to improvement in a firm‘s 
performance after an M&A.  
Although previous studies have suggested that the origin of the successor is 
critical in explaining a firm‘s performance after an executive or director change, they are 
inconclusive about whether the relationship between outside successions on firm 
performance is positive or negative. It can be hypothesized that the appointment of an 
outsider has a negative effect on performance, since outside successions are more 
disruptive than inside successions; additionally, outsiders do not have the firm-specific 
human capital of insiders
20
.  
My alternative hypothesis illuminates the positive side of appointing outsiders and 
suggests that outsiders can be change agents in that they may not be committed to the 
firm‘s past routines and policies. This study suggests one contingency where outsiders 
can play a positive role as change agents in an organization: that contingency is in 
organizations needing change, namely firms performing poorly. With the combination of 
two poor performers as the context of the study, this research extends such a contingency, 
and thus is complementary to the literature showing that poor performance predicts 
management turnover (Ocasio, 1994; Schwartz & Menon, 1985). While I do not model 
management turnover, my results have implications for studies that do by showing the 
possible outcomes of management change – routine disruption and performance.  
The effect of an outsider‘s appointment is not significant, and the sign of the 
coefficient is in the opposite direction, in both SW and WS mergers. This result indicates 
                                                 
20
 This firm-specific human capital includes expertise and knowledge involving ―a firm‘s 
products, customers, competitors, and employees, as well as an informal network of people 
providing information and support‖ (Bonnier & Bruner, 1989: 100). 
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that an outsider‘s presence in a TMT or BOD is not a factor for performance 
improvement in SW and WS mergers, although such combinations also include poorly 
performing firms. However, it does not mean that outsider appointments are rarely 
observed in these mergers. Table 20 shows that WS mergers have a higher ratio of 
outsiders in TMT than WW mergers, and both WS and SW mergers show a higher ratio 
of outsiders on a BOD than in a group of WW mergers.  
This finding implies that the non-significant effect of outsiders on firm 
performance in SW or WS is not due to the low number of outsider appointments made in 
their TMTs or BODs in the first place. Although a higher ratio of outsiders is observed in 
general in SW and WS mergers than in WW mergers, outsiders are not a necessary factor 
for improving performance in these cases. In combinations of poor performers, however, 
executives or directors (not from one of the merging parties, but from outside) are 
desirable options for management change.  
The second indicator of routine disruption concerns how equally power is shared 
between merging firms in a combined entity. The effects of the power balance between 
merging firms is not significant with all three measures – Deviation from Equal 
Representation in TMT, Deviation from Equal Representation in BOD and Deviation 
from Equal Size.  This finding suggests that more equality between merging parties in 
terms of the number of positions taken by the two firms in the TMT/BOD, or the sizes of 
the two firms, is not associated with more routine disruption. As one of the plausible 
reasons for this non-significant finding, I consider the overlooked contingency where the 
power balance between merging firms can actually be an indicator of routine disruption, 
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leading to improved performance for a group of WW mergers. If the outsider ratio is high 
enough that a group of outsiders form a third power group, the balance of power just 
within the merging parties may not be a material factor for the performance of a 
combined firm. Therefore, I test whether the outsiders‘ ratio in a TMT /BOD moderates 
the relationship between the power balance in a TMT/BOD and performance 
improvement
21
.  
** Insert Figures 3a and 3b Here ** 
Figures 3a and 3b show how the outsider‘s ratio in a TMT moderates the 
relationship between a power imbalance in a TMT between merging firms and firm 
performance in WW and non-WW mergers, respectively. Figure 3a shows that the 
outsider‘s ratio in a TMT moderates the relationship between deviance from the power 
balance and M&A performance in WW mergers, such that the hypothesized negative 
relationship is observed when a new TMT has a low ratio of outsiders (below one 
standard deviation). This result indicates that in WW mergers, the power balance between 
merging firms positively affects the performance of a merged firm if the outsider‘s ratio 
in a TMT is relatively low.   
In non-WW mergers, a positive relationship between the deviation from the 
power balance in a TMT and performance is observed when a new TMT has outsiders in 
it below the mean level (see Figure 3b). Namely, in non-WW mergers, the power balance 
between merging firms negatively affects the performance of a merged firm if the 
outsider‘s ratio in a TMT is relatively low. Likewise, the outsider‘s ratio on a BOD 
moderates the relationship between the deviance from the power balance and M&A 
                                                 
21
 The variables were centered before they were entered as interaction terms. 
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performance in WW mergers, such that the hypothesized negative relationship is 
observed when a new BOD has a low ratio of outsiders (see Figure 3c). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that although the power balance has a non-significant main effect 
on M&A performance, it still affects M&A performance such that the smaller the ratio of 
outsiders in the merged entity, the stronger the relationship between the power balance 
and merger performance.  
The third indicator of routine disruption, resource unrelatedness, does not have 
hypothesized effects with both measures – industry overlap and geography overlap.  The 
coefficients for these variables are not significant. Moreover, the sign of the coefficients 
are opposite of the predicted direction. These findings suggest that resource relatedness is 
not a material factor in improving performance through M&As for a group of WW 
mergers. Actually, this result is consistent with prior literature, which has shown 
inconclusive evidence regarding the effect of relatedness on acquisition performance. 
However, there can be two potential explanations for a non-significant effect of 
relatedness in this particular setting.  
First, it is probable that resource unrelatedness does not fully capture routine 
disruption, as intended. Industry overlap measured by 4-digit SICs or overlap of 
headquarters‘ locations at the city level is a coarse measure for the resource relatedness of 
two firms. Another possible explanation might be that the positive effect of resource 
unrelatedness as an indicator of routine disruption on merger performance may be 
cancelled out by its negative effect for other reasons. If two firms‘ businesses are related, 
based on the familiarity with the industry, the managers of each merging firm may better 
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uncover each other‘s hidden problems, may better understand what actions need to be 
taken after completion of the deal, and may more easily discover opportunities for 
synergy (Dundas & Richardson, 1982). This explanation might help interpret the results 
of the hypotheses regarding resource relatedness. 
In sum, the results of this study suggest that routine disruption, manifested as the 
ratio of outsiders in a TMT/BOD and the power balance, plays a substantial role in the 
performance of WW mergers.  
Contribution 
Although mergers between poor performers are a prevalent phenomenon, no 
systematic empirical evidence exists on whether and when such mergers are successful. 
By addressing what predicts the performance of such mergers, this study intends to 
eliminate that void. This research question illuminates a phenomenon that has not 
received much attention. Although there are a few prior studies involving the conditions 
under which acquisitions for financially distressed firms can work (e.g., Bruton et al., 
1994), they do not consider cases where acquirers are also poorly performing firms. In 
addition, the conditions tested in the extant research do not differ much from those that 
have been found as predictors for performance in general acquisitions. 
 The results of this study are important for extending our understanding of WW 
mergers and M&A in general. I empirically document that WW mergers are not rare 
events, but occur regularly. In addition, I find that WW mergers systematically differ 
from mergers, where at least one firm is well performing. By showing that the presence 
of more outside executives or directors in a resulting TMT or BOD has a strong positive 
effect on improving the performance in WW mergers and an opposite effect in non-WW 
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mergers, this study suggests that routine disruption is indeed beneficial in WW mergers. 
Moreover, this study suggests what the desirable make-up of a TMT and BOD would be 
for routine disruption. 
With the combination of two poor performers as the context of this study, the 
theory I develop in this research highlights how M&As can play a role in a firm‘s 
evolutionary process. By conceptualizing a merger as the combination of two firms‘ 
existing routines and by suggesting that a merger can change firms‘ internal routines by 
affecting the variation and selection processes of routines, I provide a richer theoretical 
explanation for 1) the conditions under which routines can change; and 2) the relationship 
between M&As and firm evolution. Also, by highlighting that mergers can function as an 
impetus for change, this study intends to develop a framework complementary to the 
extant M&A theories, which is necessary for a thorough understanding of the 
phenomenon of mergers. Finally, by suggesting that routine disruption can be helpful for 
certain types of combinations, I extend the possible sources of value creation from 
M&As.  
This is an important and relevant topic, given that there have been many merger 
talks between poor performers since late 2008. Although the government has led several 
mergers, such as that between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, the jury was out 
about the effectiveness of this deal in many cases, and this criticism seemed to be based 
on the conventional cynicism stated earlier. By providing alternative criteria to assess the 
value from the merger of two weak firms, this paper can provide many implications to the 
field of government policy, as well as competitive strategy. I argue that two weak firms 
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can, in fact, perform well if they use merger-induced disruption as an opportunity to 
change and show that they are committed to this change.  
While the prior literature on post-merger integration sees this practice as 
disruptive and harmful, I suggest that in mergers between weak performers, disruption 
may actually be beneficial and desirable if it triggers organizational renewal. Finally, this 
study can contribute to the corporate turnaround literature. Mergers have not been 
considered as popular turnaround strategies for poor performers unless they are the target 
being disciplined by the acquirer. In contrast, this study implies that weak performers can 
take a more active role as acquirers (if an affordable poorly performing target is 
available), as such a transaction can create value by triggering change that would 
otherwise be harder to achieve. 
Limitations  
 
This research has several possible limitations. First, routine disruption, the 
mechanism through which the variables of interest in this study affect performance in 
WW mergers, was not directly measured and tested. Instead, it was assumed that the 
three indicators – the influx of outsiders, the power balance, and resource unrelatedness – 
would result in routine disruption in a merged company, and thus a positive performance 
outcome would follow. Although an explanation on how routine disruption—manifested 
by three factors—is based on theoretical arguments, this remains a potential issue that I 
will address in future research. 
Second, I examined only the first 10-K and DEF 14A after the closing of the 
merger to capture the make-up of the TMT and BOD of a merged company. Given that 
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there is the possibility that the initial set of executive officers or directors may not always 
reflect the set of executive officers or directors going forward, it would have been more 
comprehensive if I had examined the two periods – the first and second years after the 
closing of the merger. Since it is not unusual for firms to be engaged in another M&A in 
subsequent years after the focal transaction, however, investigating longer periods would 
not be desirable due to possible confounding factors.   
A third potential limitation is that the study includes only US M&As between 
public firms, and therefore, the results may have limited generalizability.  Although no 
finding is dependent on the country or public status of a firm, I will address this issue in 
future research, which will expand the scope of this study to other countries and private 
firms. 
Directions for Future Research 
 
Both the limitations and the findings of this study present avenues for future 
research. In later work, I will build on the current research and will examine if the 
untested mechanism in this study is indeed at work. As one possible manifestation of 
routine disruption, strategic change after an M&A can be considered. I will examine if 
the indicators of routine disruption in this study eventually predict whether a merged firm 
executes strategic change, what type of strategic change it implements, and the 
characteristics of successful change. A composite measure of strategic change following 
Zhang and Rajagopalan‘s (2010) suggestion22 might be a doable option.  
                                                 
22
 Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) suggested six dimensions of a strategy profile to create a 
composite measure of strategic change: (1) advertising intensity (advertising/sales); (2) research 
and development intensity (R&D/sales); (3) plan and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E); 
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I will also examine the effect of TMT/BOD composition on the decision of a poor 
performer to be merged with another firm as a turnaround strategy. In particular, 
examining how board ties (executives and directors who are on other firms‘ boards) 
affect the decision to merge with another firm, and the composition of the resulting TMT 
and BOD after closing a merger will be an interesting topic to study. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(4)nonproduction overhead (selling, general, and administrative [SGA] expenses/sales); (5) 
inventory levels (inventories/sales); and (6) financial leverage (debt/equity). These dimensions 
are based on aspects of a firm‘s strategic profile (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Data on these 
six strategic dimensions can be obtained from Compustat. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2a. Histogram of Number of Executives from Target 
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Figure 2b. Histogram of Number of Executives from Outside 
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Figure 2c. Histogram of Number of Directors from Target 
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Figure 2d. Histogram of Number of Directors from Outside 
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Figure 3a. Moderating Effect of Outsiders in TMT on the Relationship between 
Deviation from Equal Representation in TMT and M&A Performance in WW Mergers 
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Slope of M&A Performance on Deviation From Equal 
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Figure 3b. Moderating Effect of Outsiders in TMT on the Relationship between 
Deviation from Equal Representation in TMT and M&A Performance in non-WW 
Mergers 
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Figure 3c. Moderating Effect of Outsiders in BOD on the Relationship between 
Deviation from Equal Representation in BOD and M&A Performance in WW Mergers 
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Figure 3d. Moderating Effect of Outsiders in BOD on the Relationship between 
Deviation from Equal Representation in BOD and M&A Performance in non-WW 
Mergers 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Example of influx of outsiders into post-merger top management team 
Phone.com and Software.com, completed on Nov 17, 2000 (Source: Proxy Statement of 
Nov 2001) 
 
Name  Age  Position  Previous 
Organization  
Donald Listwin  42  Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive 
Officer and President  
Cisco Systems  
John 
MacFarlane  
35  Chief Technology Officer and Director  Software.com  
Alan Black  41  Senior Vice President, Corporate Affairs 
and Chief Financial Officer  
Phone.com  
Michael 
Mulica  
38  Senior Vice President, Office of Customer 
Operations, Sales  
Phone.com  
Allen Snyder  47  Senior Vice President, Office of Customer 
Operations, Customer Advocacy 
Digital Equipment 
Corp  
Kevin 
Kennedy  
45  Chief Operating Officer Cisco Systems  
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Table 2. Year when Deals were Announced (N=298) 
 
Year Frequency Percent
1994 4 1.34
1995 17 5.7
1996 23 7.72
1997 28 9.4
1998 25 8.39
1999 40 13.42
2000 28 9.4
2001 30 10.07
2002 18 6.04
2003 22 7.38
2004 23 7.72
2005 26 8.72
2006 14 4.7
Total 298 100  
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Table 3a. Industry Description based on Primary Industry of Acquirer (at major group 
level) 
 
Industry (defined at 2-digit SIC code) Frequency Percent
Oil and gas extraction 12 4.03
Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 1 0.34
Building construction - general contractors and operative builders 5 1.68
Construction - special trade and contractors 1 0.34
Food and kindred products 5 1.69
Textile mill products 1 0.34
Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials 1 0.34
Lumber and wood products, except furniture 1 0.34
Furniture and fixtures 2 0.67
Paper and allied products 3 1.02
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 7 2.36
Chemicals and allied products 16 5.38
Petroleum refining and related industries 1 0.34
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 2 0.68
Primary metal industries 5 1.68
Fabricated metal products, except machinary and transportation equipment 4 1.36
Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipmetn 22 7.41
Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment 29 9.73
Transportation equipment 12 4.03
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and optical goods; whatches and clocks 23 7.72
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 5 1.68
Raiload transportation 1 0.34
Motor freight transportation and warehousing 1 0.34
Transportation services 1 0.34
Communications 9 3.02
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 9 3.02
Wholesale trade - durable goods 3 1.01
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods 3 1.01
Building materials, hardware, garden supply, and mobile home dealers 1 0.34
General merchandise stores 1 0.34
Food stores 3 1.01
Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 1 0.34
Apparel and accessory stores 2 0.68
Eating and drinking places 2 0.67
Miscellaneous retail 4 1.36
Depository institutions 1 0.34
Nondepository credit institutions 1 0.34
Security and commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges, and services 2 0.67
Insurance carriers 12 4.04
Holding and other investments offices 10 3.36
Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging places 3 1.01
Personal services 2 0.68
Business services 54 18.14
Motion pictures 2 0.67
Amusement and recreation services 3 1.01
Health services 5 1.69
Engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services 4 1.35
Total 298 100  
 
For description of primary industry in Table 3a-3d, I referred SIC manual‘s descriptions of major group and 
division. 
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Table 3b. Industry Description based on Primary Industry of Target (at major group 
level) 
 
 
Industry (defined at 2-digit SIC code) Frequency Percent
Oil and gas extraction 13 4.37
Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 1 0.34
Building construction - general contractors and operative builders 5 1.68
Heavy construction other than building construction - contractors 1 0.34
Food and kindred products 6 2.01
Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials 1 0.34
Lumber and wood products, except furniture 1 0.34
Furniture and fixtures 2 0.67
Paper and allied products 2 0.68
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 9 3.04
Chemicals and allied products 15 5.05
Petroleum refining and related industries 1 0.34
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 4 1.34
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 2 0.68
Primary metal industries 1 0.34
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment 3 1.02
Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 26 8.74
Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment 31 10.41
Transportation equipment 9 3.03
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and optical goods; watches and clocks 23 7.72
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 3 1.01
Railroad transportation 1 0.34
Motor freight transportation and warehousing 1 0.34
Transportation by air 1 0.34
Pipelines, except natural gas 1 0.34
Communications 10 3.36
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 7 2.35
Wholesale trade - durable goods 8 2.7
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods 2 0.67
General merchandise stores 2 0.67
Food stores 2 0.67
Apparel and accessory stores 2 0.68
Eating and drinking places 2 0.67
Miscellaneous retail 4 1.35
Depository institutions 1 0.34
Nondepository credit institutions 1 0.34
Security and commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges, and services 1 0.34
Insurance carriers 8 2.7
Insurance agents, brokers, and service 3 1.01
Real estate 1 0.34
Holding and other investment offices 11 3.7
Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging places 4 1.34
Personal services 1 0.34
Business services 53 17.8
Health services 5 1.69
Educational services 1 0.34
Engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services 6 2.02
Total 298 100
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Table 3c. Industry Description based on Primary Industry of Acquirer (at division level) 
 
Industry Frequency Percent
Construction 6 2.01
Finance 26 8.72
Manufacturing 139 46.64
Mining 13 4.36
Retail 14 4.7
Service 73 24.5
Transportation 21 7.05
Wholesale 6 2.01
Total 298 100          
 
 
Table 3d. Industry Description based on Primary Industry of Target (at division level) 
 
Industry Frequency Percent
Construction 6 2.01
Finance 26 8.72
Manufacturing 139 46.64
Mining 14 4.7
Retail 12 4.03
Service 70 23.49
Transportation 21 7.05
Wholesale 10 3.36
Total 298 100  
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Table 4. Number of Segments and Tobin‘s Q Ratio for Three Years prior to M&A 
Announcement  
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Acquiror's # of Segments in Year 1 298 2.181 1.407 1 8
Acquiror's # of Segments in Year 2 298 2.013 1.402 1 8
Acquiror's # of Segments in Year 3 298 1.983 1.430 1 9
Target's # of Segments in Year 1 298 1.624 1.031 1 8
Target's # of Segments in Year 2 298 1.487 0.940 1 8
Target's # of Segments in Year 3 298 1.487 0.940 1 8
Acquiror's Q Ratio in Year 1 298 2.157 1.831 0.721 16.741
Acquiror's Q Ratio in Year 2 298 2.641 4.388 0.354 58.041
Acquiror's Q Ratio in Year 3 298 2.621 3.258 0.329 38.419
Target's Q Ratio in Year 1 298 1.806 1.455 0.386 15.197
Target's Q Ratio in Year 2 298 1.878 1.544 0.572 13.111
Target's Q Ratio in Year 3 298 2.129 1.872 0.458 14.785  
* Year-1, Year-2, and Year-3 stand for one, two, and three years preceding merger announcement, respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 5. SW Classification based on 3-year average median industry-adjusted Tobin‘s Q 
 
Acquiror-Target Frequency Percent
Strong-Strong 82 27.52
Strong-Weak 75 25.17
Weak-Strong 46 15.44
Weak-Weak 95 31.88
Total 298 100  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Sizes and Origins of TMT and BOD in a Merged Entity 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
TMT Size (Total # of Executives) 298 9.282 4.262 2 26
Executives from Acquiror 298 8.403 4.202 1 26
Executives from Target 298 0.440 0.905 0 5
Executives from Outside 298 0.446 0.883 0 7
BOD Size (Total # of Directors) 298 9.775 2.853 4 21
Directors from Acquiror 298 8.523 2.595 2 17
Directors from Target 298 0.594 1.128 0 5
Directors from Outside 298 0.661 1.000 0 7  
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Table 7a. Descriptive Statistics of Entire Sample (N=298) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 M&A Performance 298 -0.473 1.509 -14.513 2.806
2 Outsiders in TMT 298 0.051 0.107 0 0.875
3 Outsiders in BOD 298 0.066 0.094 0 0.5
4 Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT 298 0.450 0.102 0 0.5
5 Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD 298 0.440 0.109 0 0.5
6 Deviation From Equal Size 298 0.306 0.134 0.001 0.499
7 Industry Overlap 298 0.430 0.496 0 1
8 Geography Overlap 298 0.067 0.251 0 1
9 Pay in Cash 298 0.295 0.457 0 1
10 Pay in Stock 298 0.268 0.444 0 1
11 Premium 298 46.967 76.903 -95.210 1176.000
12 Contested Bid 298 0.040 0.197 0 1
13 Attitude 298 0.023 0.152 0 1
14 Year1994-1998 298 0.282 0.451 0 1
15 Year1999-2002 298 0.399 0.491 0 1
16 Acquisition Experience 298 0.453 1.085 0 13
17 log(Firm Age) 298 4.101 0.698 2.303 5.796
Variable
 
 
 
 
Table 7b. Correlations in Entire Sample (N=298) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 M&A Performance 1
2 Outsiders in TMT -0.13 1
3 Outsiders in BOD -0.09 0.22 1
4 Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.10 0.02 0.14 1
5 Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.04 0.08 0.03 0.43 1
6 Dev. From Equal Size -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.37 0.40 1
7 Industry Overlap 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.20 -0.14 1
8 Geography Overlap 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 1
9 Pay in Cash 0.08 -0.11 -0.07 0.14 0.31 0.35 -0.10 -0.09 1
10 Pay in Stock -0.21 -0.05 0.00 -0.24 -0.23 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 -0.39 1
11 Premium -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.12 -0.05 1
12 Contested Bid 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.03 1
13 Attitude 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 0.03 -0.13 0.00 0.14 0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.19 1
14 Year1994-1998 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.16 0.19 -0.10 -0.05 0.05 1
15 Year1999-2002 -0.17 0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 -0.08 -0.51 1
16 Acquisition Experience -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 1
17 log(Firm Age) 0.12 -0.15 -0.02 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.05 -0.17 -0.02 0.16 0.13 -0.01 0.09 -0.04 1  
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Table 8a. Descriptive Statistics of WW Sample (N=95) 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 M&A Performance 95 0.001 0.449 -1.568 1.488
2 Outsiders in TMT 95 0.051 0.115 0 0.800
3 Outsiders in BOD 95 0.060 0.092 0 0.375
4 Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT 95 0.454 0.093 0.100 0.500
5 Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD 95 0.460 0.085 0.167 0.500
6 Deviation From Equal Size 95 0.295 0.132 0.014 0.490
7 Industry Overlap 95 0.442 0.499 0 1
8 Geography Overlap 95 0.063 0.245 0 1
9 Pay in Cash 95 0.411 0.495 0 1
10 Pay in Stock 95 0.242 0.431 0 1
11 Premium 95 46.405 41.058 -36.020 181.690
12 Contested Bid 95 0.063 0.245 0 1
13 Attitude 95 0.042 0.202 0 1
14 Year1994-1998 95 0.263 0.443 0 1
15 Year1999-2002 95 0.326 0.471 0 1
16 Acquisition Experience 95 0.347 0.597 0 3
17 log(Firm Age) 95 4.189 0.664 2.639 5.541
Variable
 
 
 
Table 8b. Correlations in WW Sample (N=95) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 M&A Performance 1
2 Outsiders in TMT 0.26 1
3 Outsiders in BOD 0.29 0.38 1
4 Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.02 -0.13 0.06 1
5 Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.16 1
6 Dev. From Equal Size 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.31 0.35 1
7 Industry Overlap -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.21 -0.32 -0.25 1
8 Geography Overlap 0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.07 -0.23 1
9 Pay in Cash -0.04 -0.14 -0.23 0.13 0.32 0.39 -0.18 -0.04 1
10 Pay in Stock 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.18 -0.15 -0.22 0.09 -0.15 -0.47 1
11 Premium -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.01 1
12 Contested Bid -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.15 0.12 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.23 1
13 Attitude 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.16 0.10 -0.26 0.02 0.16 -0.07 -0.12 0.22 0.38 1
14 Year1994-1998 0.15 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.21 0.33 -0.14 -0.06 0.11 1
15 Year1999-2002 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.01 -0.18 0.22 -0.09 -0.15 -0.42 1
16 Acquisition Experience 0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 0.21 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 0.09 -0.03 1
17 log(Firm Age) -0.20 -0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.22 -0.01 -0.19 0.00 0.21 0.24 -0.05 0.07 -0.19 1  
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Table 9a. Descriptive Statistics of Non-WW Sample (N=203) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 M&A Performance 203 -0.695 1.761 -14.513 2.806
2 Outsiders in TMT 203 0.051 0.104 0 0.875
3 Outsiders in BOD 203 0.068 0.095 0 0.500
4 Deviation From Equal Representation in TMT 203 0.448 0.106 0 0.500
5 Deviation From Equal Representation in BOD 203 0.430 0.118 0 0.500
6 Deviation From Equal Size 203 0.312 0.135 0.001 0.499
7 Industry Overlap 203 0.424 0.495 0 1
8 Geography Overlap 203 0.069 0.254 0 1
9 Pay in Cash 203 0.241 0.429 0 1
10 Pay in Stock 203 0.281 0.450 0 1
11 Premium 203 47.230 88.942 -95.210 1176.000
12 Contested Bid 203 0.030 0.170 0 1
13 Attitude 203 0.015 0.121 0 1
14 Year1994-1998 203 0.291 0.455 0 1
15 Year1999-2002 203 0.433 0.497 0 1
16 Acquisition Experience 203 0.502 1.248 0 13
17 log(Firm Age) 203 4.059 0.711 2.303 5.796
Variable
 
 
 
 
Table 9b. Correlations in Non-WW Sample (N=203) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 M&A Performance 1
2 Outsiders in TMT -0.21 1
3 Outsiders in BOD -0.14 0.14 1
4 Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.12 0.09 0.17 1
5 Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.08 0.09 0.03 0.51 1
6 Dev. From Equal Size -0.04 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.44 1
7 Industry Overlap 0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.17 -0.09 1
8 Geography Overlap 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.21 -0.21 -0.11 0.04 1
9 Pay in Cash 0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.35 -0.06 -0.11 1
10 Pay in Stock -0.25 -0.08 0.00 -0.26 -0.25 -0.04 -0.18 0.09 -0.35 1
11 Premium -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.15 -0.06 1
12 Contested Bid 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.09 0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 1
13 Attitude -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.04 -0.02 1
14 Year1994-1998 0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.13 0.13 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 1
15 Year1999-2002 -0.18 0.05 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.17 -0.04 -0.02 -0.56 1
16 Acquisition Experience -0.04 0.00 -0.10 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.04 1
17 log(Firm Age) 0.15 -0.18 -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.15 -0.03 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.00 1  
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Table 10. Comparison of the Means of Variables for WW vs. Non-WW Mergers 
Variable WW Non-WW t-statistics
M&A Performance 0.001 -0.695 -5.283***
Outsiders in TMT 0.051 0.051 -0.005
Outsiders in BOD 0.060 0.068 0.654
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.454 0.448 -0.483
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD 0.460 0.430 -2.494**
Dev. From Equal Size 0.295 0.312 1.017
Industry Overlap 0.442 0.424 -0.298
Geography Overlap 0.063 0.069 0.189
Pay in Cash 0.411 0.241 -2.867*
Pay in Stock 0.242 0.281 0.712
Premium 46.405 47.230 0.110
Contested Bid 0.063 0.030 -1.210
Attitude 0.042 0.015 -1.221
Year1994-1998 0.263 0.291 0.495
Year1999-2002 0.326 0.433 1.798*
Acquisition Experience 0.347 0.502 1.451
log(Firm Age) 4.189 4.059 -1.543
Observations 95 203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 11a. OLS Regression Results – Entire Sample 
 
 
Dependent Variable: M&A Peformance Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Outsiders in TMT -1.758** -1.403*
(0.806) (0.825)
Outsiders in BOD -1.073 -1.000
(0.920) (0.938)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 1.416 2.103**
(0.925) (0.975)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -1.386 -1.828*
(0.904) (0.947)
Industry Overlap 0.074 0.035 0.013
(0.178) (0.181) (0.180)
Geography Overlap 0.514 0.399 0.441
(0.344) (0.346) (0.344)
Dev. From Equal Size -0.600 -0.931 -0.053 -0.518
(0.696) (0.742) (0.749) (0.764)
Pay in Cash 0.055 0.052 0.099 0.099
(0.218) (0.222) (0.223) (0.224)
Pay in Stock -0.735*** -0.701*** -0.787*** -0.734***
(0.213) (0.222) (0.219) (0.222)
Premium -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Contested Bid -0.182 -0.150 -0.106 -0.076
(0.449) (0.445) (0.449) (0.445)
Attitude -0.291 -0.371 -0.328 -0.260
(0.584) (0.585) (0.588) (0.584)
Year1994-1998 0.206 0.217 0.269 0.261
(0.227) (0.226) (0.228) (0.226)
Year1999-2002 -0.487** -0.456** -0.443** -0.431**
(0.208) (0.207) (0.209) (0.207)
Acquisition Experience -0.037 -0.057 -0.056 -0.069
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
log(Firm Age) 0.227* 0.168 0.230* 0.177
(0.126) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128)
Constant -0.850 -1.131 -0.416 -0.751
(0.574) (0.697) (0.678) (0.722)
Observations 298 298 298 298
F-Statistics 3.028 2.859 2.600 2.815
R-squared 0.095 0.124 0.114 0.138
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Entire Sample
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Table 11b. OLS Regression Results – WW and Non-WW Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: M&A Peformance Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Outsiders in TMT 1.116*** 0.797* -3.608*** -3.049***
(0.415) (0.444) (1.163) (1.148)
Outsiders in BOD 1.536*** 1.170** -2.177* -2.386*
(0.518) (0.554) (1.278) (1.269)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.177 0.072 1.961 3.768***
(0.553) (0.547) (1.273) (1.352)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.304 -0.414 -2.918** -3.871***
(0.628) (0.626) (1.206) (1.268)
Industry Overlap 0.050 0.004 0.028 0.001 -0.090 -0.148
(0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.248) (0.254) (0.246)
Geography Overlap 0.315 0.286 0.317 0.816* 0.513 0.656
(0.207) (0.205) (0.204) (0.477) (0.480) (0.468)
Dev. From Equal Size 0.379 0.430 0.318 0.414 -0.429 -0.826 0.900 0.118
(0.423) (0.435) (0.432) (0.438) (0.966) (1.035) (1.052) (1.051)
Pay in Cash -0.027 0.043 0.104 0.121 -0.062 -0.114 0.015 0.018
(0.116) (0.116) (0.122) (0.121) (0.326) (0.326) (0.325) (0.321)
Pay in Stock -0.008 0.057 0.068 0.081 -1.007*** -1.044*** -1.219*** -1.151***
(0.137) (0.138) (0.135) (0.136) (0.290) (0.305) (0.303) (0.300)
Premium -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Contested Bid -0.224 -0.148 -0.157 -0.141 -0.292 -0.224 -0.185 -0.009
(0.216) (0.214) (0.212) (0.210) (0.717) (0.708) (0.715) (0.693)
Attitude 0.408 0.443 0.403 0.459 -0.450 -0.561 -0.655 -0.537
(0.281) (0.281) (0.278) (0.280) (1.000) (0.987) (0.994) (0.963)
Year1994-1998 0.133 0.128 0.169 0.158 0.203 0.223 0.368 0.388
(0.123) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.325) (0.319) (0.325) (0.315)
Year1999-2002 0.050 0.047 0.080 0.070 -0.581* -0.497* -0.406 -0.328
(0.116) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.300) (0.294) (0.302) (0.294)
Acquisition Experience 0.050 0.062 0.040 0.061 -0.049 -0.065 -0.092 -0.104
(0.082) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094)
log(Firm Age) -0.137* -0.139* -0.154** -0.142* 0.331* 0.215 0.340** 0.228
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.173) (0.174) (0.172) (0.170)
Constant 0.422 0.203 0.467 0.361 -1.346* -1.518 -0.450 -0.911
(0.355) (0.427) (0.451) (0.493) (0.775) (0.931) (0.890) (0.930)
Observations 95 95 95 95 203 203 203 203
F-Statistics 0.932 1.356 1.484 1.521 2.710 3.019 2.771 3.497
R-squared 0.100 0.192 0.206 0.238 0.124 0.184 0.171 0.231
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Non-WWWW
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Table 12. Results of Chow Tests (WW vs. Non-WW Mergers) 
Variable WW Non-WW Chow Test
Outsiders in TMT 0.797* -3.049*** 5.122***
Outsiders in BOD 1.170** -2.386* 4.574**
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.072 3.768*** -3.836**
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.414 -3.871*** 2.134
Dev. From Equal Size 0.414 0.118 -0.368
Industry Overlap 0.028 -0.148 0.055
Geography Overlap 0.317 0.656 -0.615
Pay in Cash 0.121 0.018 -0.439
Pay in Stock 0.081 -1.151*** 1.138***
Premium -0.001 -0.001 0.003
Contested Bid -0.141 -0.009 -0.350
Attitude 0.459 -0.537 0.117
Year1994-1998 0.158 0.388 -0.036
Year1999-2002 0.070 -0.328 0.265
Acquisition Experience 0.061 -0.104 0.236
log(Firm Age) -0.142* 0.228 -0.614**
Observations 95 203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Regression coefficients are shown in the table.  
 
Table 13. Predicted Effects and Findings 
Hypothesis Variable Predicted Sign Finding
H1a Outsiders in TMT Positive Supported
H1b Outsiders in BOD Positive Supported
H2a Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT Negative Not Supported
H2b Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD Negative Not Supported
H2c Dev. From Equal Size Negative Not Supported
H3a Industry Overlap Negative Not Supported
H3b Geography Overlap Negative Not Supported
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Table 14. OLS Regression Results – SS Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: M&A Peformance Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Outsiders in TMT -6.611*** -5.378**
(1.974) (2.073)
Outsiders in BOD -2.282 -1.928
(2.934) (2.724)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 7.749*** 8.635***
(2.625) (2.646)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -4.835* -4.299*
(2.502) (2.401)
Industry Overlap 0.669 0.470 0.409
(0.479) (0.546) (0.495)
Geography Overlap 1.201 1.501 1.328
(1.698) (1.859) (1.684)
Dev. From Equal Size -1.119 -2.434 1.091 -1.281
(2.185) (2.192) (2.387) (2.282)
Pay in Cash 0.146 0.046 0.257 0.175
(0.736) (0.676) (0.749) (0.690)
Pay in Stock -0.944 -0.503 -1.080* -0.596
(0.616) (0.630) (0.639) (0.628)
Premium -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Contested Bid -1.108 0.015 -0.871 0.121
(2.347) (2.144) (2.317) (2.123)
Attitude -0.444 -0.231 -1.409 -0.464
(1.672) (1.749) (1.908) (1.738)
Year1994-1998 0.512 0.273 0.153 0.170
(0.738) (0.674) (0.744) (0.672)
Year1999-2002 -0.634 -0.610 -0.859 -0.721
(0.634) (0.571) (0.650) (0.588)
Acquisition Experience -0.021 -0.075 -0.058 -0.081
(0.152) (0.137) (0.157) (0.141)
log(Firm Age) 0.554 0.215 0.673 0.274
(0.422) (0.407) (0.434) (0.412)
Constant -2.310 -4.027* -1.258 -2.979
(1.830) (2.028) (2.127) (2.090)
Observations 82 82 82 82
F-Statistics 1.120 2.563 1.327 2.501
R-squared 0.136 0.349 0.217 0.381
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
(Standard errors in parentheses)
SS
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Table 15. Results of Chow Tests (WW vs. SS Mergers) 
 
Variable WW SS Chow Test
Outsiders in TMT 0.797* -5.378** 8.129***
Outsiders in BOD 1.170** -1.928 5.510**
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.072 8.635*** -7.361***
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.414 -4.299* 3.420
Dev. From Equal Size 0.414 -1.281 0.527
Industry Overlap 0.028 0.409 -0.569
Geography Overlap 0.317 1.328 -0.771
Pay in Cash 0.121 0.175 -0.379
Pay in Stock 0.081 -0.596 1.001*
Premium -0.001 -0.001 0.003
Contested Bid -0.141 0.121 -0.365
Attitude 0.459 -0.464 0.065
Year1994-1998 0.158 0.170 -0.442
Year1999-2002 0.070 -0.721 0.726
Acquisition Experience 0.061 -0.081 0.065
log(Firm Age) -0.142* 0.274 -0.849**
Observations 95 82
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Regression coefficients are shown in the table.  
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Table 16a. Descriptive Statistics of CARs in WW Sample (N=95) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
5-days CAR 95 0.047 0.097 -0.179 0.421
256-days CAR 95 0.029 0.537 -1.676 1.940  
 
 
Table 16b. Correlations of CARs with other Variables in WW Sample  
 
5-day CARs 256-day CARs M&A Performance 
5-day CARs 1
256-day CARs 0.381 1
M&A Performance (Q-based) -0.031 0.193 1
Outsiders in TMT 0.084 0.035 0.259
Outsiders in BOD 0.162 0.207 0.287
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT -0.132 0.081 0.019
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD 0.117 -0.013 0.054
Dev. From Equal Size -0.264 -0.203 0.062
Industry Overlap 0.046 -0.068 -0.044
Geography Overlap 0.020 0.032 0.121
Pay in Cash 0.032 0.130 -0.035
Pay in Stock -0.144 -0.031 0.052
Premium 0.297 0.019 -0.017
Contested Bid -0.021 -0.011 -0.138
Attitude 0.076 0.022 0.053
Year1994-1998 -0.010 -0.012 0.146
Year1999-2002 0.227 -0.053 -0.040
Acquisition Experience -0.154 0.057 0.116
log(Firm Age) 0.030 -0.058 -0.201  
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Table 17a. Descriptive Statistics of CARs in non-WW Sample (N=203) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
5-days CAR 203 0.029 0.092 -0.218 0.457
256-days CAR 203 -0.043 0.609 -2.765 2.028  
 
Table 17b. Correlations of CARs with other Variables in non-WW Sample 
  
5-day CARs 256-day CARs M&A Performance 
5-day CARs 1
256-day CARs 0.256 1
M&A Performance (Q-based) 0.022 0.260 1
Outsiders in TMT 0.139 -0.183 -0.207
Outsiders in BOD -0.002 -0.072 -0.141
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT -0.172 -0.173 0.117
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.002 -0.154 -0.085
Dev. From Equal Size -0.254 -0.067 -0.037
Industry Overlap -0.012 0.023 0.043
Geography Overlap -0.046 -0.014 0.077
Pay in Cash 0.006 0.047 0.060
Pay in Stock -0.103 0.073 -0.254
Premium 0.120 -0.024 -0.054
Contested Bid 0.010 -0.090 0.025
Attitude 0.001 -0.046 -0.006
Year1994-1998 0.033 -0.014 0.120
Year1999-2002 0.031 -0.072 -0.179
Acquisition Experience -0.092 -0.032 -0.044
log(Firm Age) 0.024 0.005 0.148  
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Table 18. Results from OLS Regression and Chow Tests (Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
[-3,+252] as Dependent Variable)  
 
Dependent Variable: M&A Peformance Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Outsiders in TMT 0.227 -0.260 -0.879** -0.834* 0.989
(0.503) (0.529) (0.426) (0.432)
Outsiders in BOD 1.673*** 1.765*** -0.327 -0.088 1.979**
(0.610) (0.660) (0.471) (0.478)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT 0.811 0.652 -0.891* -0.710 1.145
(0.670) (0.651) (0.466) (0.509)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD -0.612 -0.574 -0.796* -0.444 0.401
(0.740) (0.746) (0.444) (0.477)
Industry Overlap -0.144 -0.185 -0.175 0.030 0.008 0.015 -0.143
(0.127) (0.124) (0.127) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093)
Geography Overlap 0.045 0.072 0.047 -0.104 -0.090 -0.120 0.241
(0.251) (0.241) (0.243) (0.175) (0.177) (0.176)
Dev. From Equal Size -1.536*** -1.840*** -1.748*** -1.871*** -0.504 -0.177 -0.193 -0.075 -0.854
(0.497) (0.527) (0.509) (0.521) (0.349) (0.379) (0.387) (0.395)
Pay in Cash 0.289** 0.285** 0.405*** 0.402*** 0.163 0.107 0.180 0.121 0.078
(0.136) (0.141) (0.143) (0.144) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.121)
Pay in Stock -0.044 -0.018 -0.005 0.019 0.149 0.071 0.112 0.057 -0.107
(0.161) (0.167) (0.159) (0.162) (0.105) (0.112) (0.111) (0.113)
Premium 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Contested Bid -0.199 -0.167 -0.143 -0.157 -0.351 -0.314 -0.295 -0.296 0.255
(0.254) (0.259) (0.249) (0.250) (0.259) (0.259) (0.263) (0.261)
Attitude -0.128 -0.129 -0.136 -0.107 -0.300 -0.293 -0.290 -0.295 0.448
(0.331) (0.341) (0.327) (0.334) (0.362) (0.361) (0.366) (0.362)
Year1994-1998 -0.048 -0.070 -0.018 -0.025 -0.131 -0.125 -0.095 -0.109 0.029
(0.145) (0.146) (0.141) (0.142) (0.117) (0.117) (0.120) (0.119)
Year1999-2002 -0.133 -0.162 -0.127 -0.128 -0.159 -0.147 -0.129 -0.136 0.043
(0.137) (0.138) (0.134) (0.135) (0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.111)
Acquisition Experience 0.106 0.093 0.123 0.090 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.005 0.068
(0.096) (0.101) (0.096) (0.100) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
log(Firm Age) -0.015 -0.039 -0.030 -0.044 0.039 0.019 0.044 0.021 -0.036
(0.089) (0.092) (0.088) (0.089) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
Constant 0.398 0.260 0.684 0.478 0.003 0.450 0.239 0.521
(0.417) (0.517) (0.531) (0.587) (0.280) (0.341) (0.327) (0.350)
Observations 95 95 95 95 203 203 203 203
R-squared 0.129 0.169 0.228 0.242 0.044 0.087 0.063 0.091
F-Statistics 1.249 1.165 1.689 1.556 0.880 1.273 0.898 1.162
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
(Standard errors in parentheses)
WW Non-WW
Chow Test
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Table 19. Results from OLS Regression and Chow Tests (Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
[-2,+2] as Dependent Variable)  
 
Dependent Variable: M&A Peformance Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Outsiders in TMT 0.027 -0.071 0.136** 0.125** -0.108
(0.082) (0.084) (0.062) (0.063)
Outsiders in BOD 0.200** 0.237** 0.013 0.025 0.149
(0.097) (0.105) (0.069) (0.070)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in TMT -0.076 -0.103 -0.130* -0.175** 0.088
(0.109) (0.103) (0.068) (0.074)
Dev. From Equal Rep.in BOD 0.273** 0.283** 0.062 0.108 0.124
(0.117) (0.118) (0.065) (0.070)
Industry Overlap -0.022 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 0.006
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Geography Overlap -0.031 -0.037 -0.037 -0.025 -0.014 -0.021 0.020
(0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Dev. From Equal Size -0.326*** -0.334*** -0.393*** -0.388*** -0.187*** -0.154*** -0.215*** -0.179*** -0.039
(0.080) (0.086) (0.081) (0.083) (0.051) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058)
Pay in Cash 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.014
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Pay in Stock -0.050* -0.058** -0.047* -0.052** -0.020 -0.025 -0.018 -0.022 -0.028
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Premium 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contested Bid -0.058 -0.060 -0.063 -0.063 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 -0.012
(0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
Attitude -0.050 -0.056 -0.066 -0.078 -0.016 -0.017 -0.012 -0.017 0.009
(0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Year1994-1998 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.012 -0.012
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Year1999-2002 0.026 0.023 0.033 0.034 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.044*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Acquisition Experience -0.012 -0.006 -0.018 -0.016 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log(Firm Age) 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.089 0.123 -0.040 0.004 0.074* 0.107** 0.066 0.090*
(0.067) (0.084) (0.084) (0.093) (0.041) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051)
Observations 95 95 95 95 203 203 203 203
R-squared 0.311 0.328 0.404 0.415 0.102 0.142 0.111 0.153
F-Statistics 3.785 2.785 3.874 3.461 2.179 2.227 1.676 2.104
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
(Standard errors in parentheses)
WW
Chow Test
Non-WW
 
 
 
Table 20. Mean of Outsider Ratio in TMT and Outsider Ratio in BOD by Subsample 
 
Acquiror-Target Mean of Outsider Ratio in TMT Mean of Outsider Ratio in BOD
Strong-Strong 0.051 0.065
Strong-Weak 0.044 0.066
Weak-Strong 0.062 0.078
Weak-Weak 0.051 0.060
Total 0.051 0.066  
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